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Abstract  
 
In September 1998, the Judicial Conference of the United States abandoned 
its latest attempt to regulate the timing of interviews and offers in the law 
clerk selection process.  This paper surveys the further unraveling of the 
market since then, makes comparisons with other entry level professional 
labor markets, and evaluates some possibilities for reform. 
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Prologue: In September of 1998 the Judicial Conference 
abandoned its most recent attempt to regulate the timing of 
interviews and offers in the process for hiring federal judicial 
law clerks. In September of 1999 most prominent law schools 
abandoned or cut back their attempts to regulate the time at 
which faculty recommendation letters could be sent. Thus the 
law clerk hiring process now gets underway at the beginning of 
the second year of law school, two years before the clerkship 
positions themselves begin. 
 What is going on here, and what, if anything, should be done about it? 
To answer the first question, we present a wide range of new and systematic 
empirical data from judges and students about their experiences in the market 
for federal judicial law clerks, and we show how the problems of this market 
resemble problems in a broad set of other markets in the economy. To answer 
the second question, about possible reform of the law clerk market, we 
describe some of the unique features of this market that make reform 
                                                                 
a  Associate Professor, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
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particularly challenging and consider whether there are ways to adapt the 
reforms that have succeeded in other markets to these unique features. 
 Federal judicial clerkships represent an important point of entry to 
many of the most sought-after positions in the legal profession. Every year top 
students from elite law schools compete for positions with judges who can 
help them to land Supreme Court clerkships, plum teaching jobs, and 
competitive law firm positions.1 At the same time, federal judges depend 
heavily on their law clerks to aid them with their workload.2 
 The essential problem with how this important market presently 
functions is that it is difficult to establish the time at which the market will 
operate. Any time that is set will tend to “unravel” because judges have an 
incentive to “jump the gun,” hiring slightly earlier than their competitors, to 
get the pick of the candidates.3 Students have strong reasons to accept early 
offers from judges, among other things because they will not know what their 
other options may be and also because it is, quite simply, difficult and 
uncomfortable to hold off a federal judge. Judge Kozinski explains the 
incentive on the judge side: “From the judge’s perspective, making an early 
offer allows him to … attract candidates who might not otherwise seriously 
consider him for a clerkship.”4 “[T]he ability to make offers early” is “a very 
important bargaining tool.”5 As described by one respondent to our survey of 
federal appellate judges: 
 I live in, and my office is located in, a country town  . . 
. . [I]t is not every young man or woman who will come here 
to live; indeed, most won’t. . . . 
 [Initially] I did not employ law clerks until they had 
finished the first term of their senior year of law school. . . .  I 
soon found out that it was more and more difficult to get law 
clerks from the top of the class. . . . But I have found that there 
are a few people in the top of the class at most law schools  
who had rather be assured of a job early, even in a town this 
size, than to wait and enter the contest in becoming clerks for 
judges in the larger cities with the larger and better-advertised 
                                                                 
1 See generally Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J. 
1707, 1709 (1991) (describing judges’ influence over clerks’ future career 
trajectories). 
2 See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REV. 152, 
153 (1990).  
3 See Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing, Jumping the Gun:  Imperfections and 
Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions, 84 AMER. ECON. 
REV. 992, 992 (1994). 
4 Kozinski, supra note 1, at 1720. 
5 Id. at 1710. 
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reputations.6 
 The result of this incentive for jumping the gun is a situation in which 
judges scheme to out-maneuver one another in the effort to hire desirable 
clerks. Judges accuse their colleagues of “frequenting maternity wards to make 
sure they get the ‘best’ clerks.”7 The frenzy of hiring has cast the judiciary into 
disrepute in some eyes—a concern that judges have often voiced over the 
years, and a concern that is dramatically confirmed by some of the striking 
stories told by students in response to our surveys. The process by which 
clerks are hired has other negative consequences as well, as we describe 
below. 
 Part I of our analysis provides a normative framework within which to 
analyze the market for federal judicial law clerks. There is a complicated 
economics literature on the efficiency of hiring in markets with timing 
problems; we attempt to distill the essential components of this literature, 
which have not been reflected in the existing legal literature on the law clerk 
market, and we highlight some special features of the economics literature that 
bear on law clerk hiring specifically. Our normative framework provides a 
context within which to view our empirical results. 
 A fundamental goal of our project has been to gain an improved 
understanding of how the market for federal judicial law clerks actually 
operates. There are many rumors and opinions about this market, and few hard 
facts. To remedy the lack of systematic knowledge, we have surveyed both 
judges (including Supreme Court Justices) and students about the law clerk 
hiring process. The little empirical work that presently exists is quite dated 
(particularly in this rapidly changing market) and also is much less 
comprehensive than our effort.8 We use our results to present a broad 
empirical picture of the market from both judges’ and students’ perspective. 
 Part II describes our empirical findings. On the judge side, we 
surveyed all federal appellate judges in both 1999 and 2000 and received 
responses from two-thirds of the judges in 1999 and from 54% of them in 
2000. This gives us a reasonably comprehensive picture of the law clerk 
market as viewed from the judge side. We also sought the input of the nine 
                                                                 
6 1999 Judge Survey #26d. For details on our citation practices for survey 
responses, see infra Part II.B. 
7 Abner J. Mikva, Judicial Clerkships:  A Judge’s View, 36 J. LEGAL ED. 
150, 152 (1986). 
8 A survey of judges was conducted in the early 1990s, as was a survey of 
law students. See Edward R. Becker, Stephen G. Breyer & Guido Calabresi, 
The Federal Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Problem and the Modest March 1 
Solution, 104 YALE L.J. 207 (1994) (judge survey); Lynn K. Rhinehart, Is 
There Gender Bias in the Judicial Law Clerk Selection Process, 83 GEO. L.J. 
575 (1994) (student survey). 
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Justices of the United States Supreme Court and received responses from eight 
of them. On the student side, we conducted surveys in 1999 and again in 2000 
about the hiring process. Our results provide a window on how the hiring 
process is regarded by applicants, how well students are being matched to 
judges, and how the process is affecting students’ decisions to apply for 
clerkships. 
 Part III looks at other markets that have had difficulty in establishing 
the timing of transactions. Markets with such timing problems can be found in 
a wide range of settings; they include markets for athletic tournaments, 
markets for medical residents, and markets for social club memberships. Part 
III attempts to distill from the existing economics literature what has been 
learned from the extensive study of this other set of markets. 
 Part IV tackles the question of what, if anything, should be done in 
the market for federal judicial law clerks. The main possibilities, in their 
rough contours, are familiar from the existing legal literature: 1) Leave the 
hiring process unregulated (as at present); 2) Establish start dates for offers 
and perhaps also interviews (a strategy that has been tried in the law clerk 
market on numerous past occasions); and 3) Institute some form of 
centralized matching of judges and clerks. The last approach is the one 
presently used in the market for medical residency positions (as well as in a 
variety of other markets), and one of the present authors (Roth) was 
responsible for the design of the centralized matching process presently used 
for medical residencies.9 
 Because of the diversity of opinion expressed in the existing literature 
and in our surveys on the matter of reform, we will not try to focus on any one 
of these three approaches. Rather we shall attempt to describe, in light of the 
evidence and insights presented in Parts I through III, how each of these 
approaches could best be implemented; we will then assess its likelihood of 
success in light of what we know from our evidence and the experience of 
other markets. Of the possibilities we consider, the most promising appears to 
be the use of a centralized matching process for the limited set of federal 
appellate clerkships that may feed into Supreme Court clerkships, with 
enforcement of the centralized matching requirement by the Supreme Court. 
We describe this proposal in more detail in Part IV.C below.  
 
I.  A Normative Framework 
 A natural prerequisite for assessing whether what is happening in the 
market for federal judicial law clerks is good or bad is a set of normative 
                                                                 
9 See Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, The Redesign of the Matching 
Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic 
Design, 89 AMER. ECON. REV. 748 (1999). 
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criteria against which to make that assessment. We begin with the concern 
most often voiced by judges—that the current process casts the bench into 
disrepute. We then turn to the question of the efficiency and perceived fairness 
of the current process of law clerk hiring.  
 Throughout the discussion it is important to distinguish between two 
separate, although related, features of the market for law clerks. The first is 
that hiring tends to occur in a rough-and-tumble manner, with judges making 
short- fuse offers, trying to out-maneuver each other, and so forth. The second, 
distinct feature is that hiring tends to occur very early in the student’s law 
school career. These two things are related in important ways, of course, but 
for our normative analysis it is important to distinguish between them. 10 
 Throughout our discussion we focus on the market for federal, and 
especially federal appellate, judicial clerkships. We adopt this focus because 
the market for federal, and particularly federal appellate, clerkships is the 
market in which most of the problems with which we are concerned have 
arisen. 
 
A. Disillusionment with the federal bench. 
 From judges’ perspective, the biggest concern with the current state 
of the law clerk market seems to be the disrepute cast upon the bench by the 
way in which hiring is done. (Judges are also likely to care about some of the 
other problems we describe below.) Indeed, the impetus for one of the prior 
reform efforts was an article in The New York Times that painted a colorful 
picture of the judicial “free for all” that occurred as judges “behav[ed] like 6-
year-olds” in the “scramble” to hire law clerks.11 One judge likened the 
process to a “calf scramble,” which is “the low point of many western rodeos. 
A small number of calves are turned loose in the arena, along with a larger 
number of adolescent cow persons. The latter attempt to seize, subdue, and 
carry out the former. The SPCA writes letters to the editor during the 
following week.”12 (Presumably the “adolescent cow persons” here are the 
judges.) 
 The “judicial disrepute” normative perspective on the law clerk 
market is relatively simple. A system in which hiring occurred in an orderly 
and respectable manner would be preferable to a system that can be likened 
                                                                 
10 See generally Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen, Unraveling in Matching Markets, 
88 AMER.  ECON.  REV. 371, 372 (1998) (discussing the distinction between 
strategic behavior in transactions and how early the transactions occur). 
11 See Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 209-10 (quoting David 
Margolick, At the Bar: Annual Race for Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash, with 
Judicial Decorum Left in the Dust, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1989, at B4). 
12 Id. at 210 (quoting Judge Alfred T. Goodwin).  
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to a “calf scramble.” The fact that hiring occurs early in the students’ law 
school careers might not be an independent problem on this view; rather it 
may be merely a symptom of the other problem—that judges are jockeying 
for position and trying to out-maneuver one another in the competition for 
the best law clerks. 
 Other normative criteria turn out to be more complex, as we shall see. 
 
B. Efficiency. 
From an economist’s perspective, the natural question to ask about 
the market for federal judicial law clerks is whether it is efficient. Markets 
normally give some promise of efficiency if they allow participants to 
compare the alternatives available in the marketplace. Thus one potential 
source of inefficiency in the law clerk market is that the “calf scramble” 
forces judges and students to make choices before they can make real 
comparisons. A second (related but distinct) potential cause of inefficiency is 
the early date at which hiring takes place. If the quality of the match between 
judge and clerk depends on attributes that are not adequately predicted by 
information available after the first year of law school (and would be better 
predicted by a student’s full law school record), then hiring may be occurring 
at an inefficiently early time.13  
We elaborate on these issues below, considering them in the light of 
several different possible standards of efficiency. 
 
 1. Pareto efficiency. 
 One standard is Pareto efficiency, which says that an outcome is 
efficient as long as there is no way to make one or more parties better off 
without making at least one person worse off. Under this standard, the market 
for federal judicial law clerks is likely to be efficient. The Pareto standard is 
notoriously weak, for rarely can one make some people better off without 
                                                                 
13  Note that salaries are highly regulated in this market. For recent analyses 
of matching in contexts where salaries are flexible, see Hao Li & Wing Suen, 
Risk Sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1058 (2000), 
and Wing Suen, A Competitive Theory of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium 
Unraveling in Two-Sided Matching, 31 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2000). For a 
discussion of relaxing salary restrictions in the market for federal judicial law 
clerks, see Edward S. Adams, A Market-Based Solution to the Judicial 
Clerkship Selection Process, 59 Md. L. Rev. 129, 167-72 (2000). However, 
many of the inefficiency results apply both to matching with fixed salaries and 
to matching with flexible salaries. See, e.g., Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 
1034-35 (theorem 2).  
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making even a single person worse off. 14 
 To be sure, it is possible that the law clerk market is suboptimal for all 
participants. It may be that some participants jump the gun because they hope 
to gain an advantage over the others, but in doing so they create a negative 
externality for the others that forces them to move early also. In this case it can 
happen that all participants would be better off if hiring occurred in an orderly 
manner, at a later time, or both. 15 But it seems more likely that some gun-
jumping judges would be made worse off by such a reform, since they would 
no longer have the bargaining advantage that they seek to get from jumping 
the gun. (Certainly Judge Kozinski’s view in his well-known article 
Confessions of a Bad Apple16 is that such reform would make him worse off.)  
 Thus, the remainder of our analysis will consider two other, more 
useful conceptions of “efficiency.”  
 
 2.  Maximizing the “sum total of satisfaction” of judges and clerks 
  with the match. 
 If the standard of efficiency is not Pareto efficiency but instead some 
broader notion of maximizing something like “the sum total of the 
satisfaction” (however measured) of judges and students with their matches, 
where some parties’ gains can be traded off against others’ losses, then several 
arguments suggest that the current market is likely to be inefficient. We first 
consider the nature of the process and then the distinct issue of the early time 
at which hiring is done.  
 
  a. The nature of the process. 
 “[M]uch of the benefit of a market has to do with bringing together 
many buyers and sellers at the same time, so that they can consider a wide 
range of possible transactions.”17 But in the present state of the market for 
federal judicial law clerks, the buyers (of clerks’ services) and sellers (of those 
services) typically can consider very few possible transactions. Indeed, in 
many instances the sellers can consider only one possible transaction—the one 
with the judge who first makes them an offer, as we detail in Part II below. 
 Why are many of the gains of a market lost when participants are not 
able to consider a range of options? Unlike in a well- functioning market, 
judges and students are not able to gather information about multiple options 
                                                                 
14 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 193 
(1980). 
15 See Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 10034-35 & Appendix. 
16 Kozinski, supra note 1. 
17 Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 992. 
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and then act on that information to seek out their most preferred alternatives. 
Choices must be made from a very small set of alternatives and in a very 
compressed period. Decisions must be reached on the basis of extremely 
limited information. And participants must consider not only how much they 
like each potential match, but how much the potential partner likes them, 
because time spent in ultimately fruitless courtship (for instance, in making an 
offer that is subsequently refused) means that other candidates will have 
matched and left the market. All of these features have the potential to 
introduce substantial inefficiency.18 In addition, this process may be so 
unappealing to some judges and clerks that they drop out of the process 
altogether. 
 
  b. Early hiring. 
 The costs of a rough-and-tumble process exist whatever the timing of 
hiring; even if such a process occurred at the middle or the end of students’ 
third year of law school, the inability of participants to consider a range of 
options would reduce the ordinary gains from a well- functioning market. The 
fact that hiring also occurs very early in students’ law school career poses a 
distinct set of problems. These are mostly related to the limited amount of 
information that will be available when hiring is done early (wholly apart from 
the informational limitations that result from a chaotic process). 
 As will be described more fully in Part II, almost two-thirds of the 
federal appellate judges responding to our survey about the most recent law 
clerk hiring season were entirely done with their hiring by January 31 of the 
applicants’ second year of law school. (As noted in Part II.B.3.c, a few 
students apply for clerkships in their third year, but this is a relatively small 
number.) Thus decisions for the typical judge were based solely on first-year 
grades and recommendations (since first-semester second-year grades would 
not yet be available), together with the student’s record prior to law school.  
 The problem with such early hiring is that two-thirds of the 
information about the student’s academic record in law school, plus virtually 
all of the information about the student’s legal writing, which typically is done 
in the second and third years, is missing. Obviously assessing the impact of 
this missing information on the satisfaction of judges and students with their 
matches is difficult. Is the quality of a student’s legal writing well-predicted by 
the student’s first-year grades? Are second- and third-year grades well-
predicted by first-year grades? 
                                                                 
18 Such inefficiency is examined in simulations motivated by the market for 
clinical psychologists in Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing,  Turnaround Time 
and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market 
for Clinical Psychologists, 105 J. POL. ECON. 284 (1997).  
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 It is (for obvious reasons) not very easy to get data on grades, but we 
do have data from a relatively recent Harvard Law School class, comparing 
first-year GPA to the  overall GPA for all three years. The overlap between the 
two measures in the top of the class is not small, but neither are the 
discrepancies. Of the students who were in the top 25 (of a class of 
approximately 550) at the end of the first year, 15 were in the top 25 at the end 
of the third year. The other 10 who were in the top 25 of their first year class 
were (in order of decreasing class rank) 29th, 30th 33rd, 38th, 42nd, 48th, 
58th, 62nd, 67th, and 72nd at the end of the third year. The students who were 
ranked 42nd, 43rd, 48th, 49th, 69th, and 75th would almost certainly not have 
been competitive for the top clerkships had they held those positions in class 
rank after the first year. The students who took these 10 students’ place in the 
top 25 by the end of the third year were ranked (again in order of decreasing 
rank) 26th, 29th, 32nd, 33rd, 42nd, 43rd, 48th, 49th, 69th, and 75th at the end 
of the first year. Probably the last six of these did not have a shot at the best 
clerkships based on their first year grades, even though they finished their law 
school careers comfortably within the top 5% of their class at Harvard Law 
School. (Indeed, one of these six students ended up graduating 4th in the 
class.) 
 In short, early hiring seems to create a real risk of mismatches in both 
directions: some students hired for the most competitive clerkships on the 
basis of first-year standing may prove to be less strong than judges had hoped, 
and some of the most competitive students may not be identifiable on the basis 
of first-year grades. It is true that large law firms likewise hire for second-year 
summer positions—which may turn into permanent positions—on the basis of 
first-year grades, but since law firms have a large range of types of work 
(ranging from the relatively mundane to the complex), and because they hire a 
large number of associates each year (versus a small number of clerks in the 
judicial setting), and because decisions about permanent jobs are made in 
significant part based on summer performance, errors are likely to be both less 
serious and less frequent in this market than in the law clerk market. 
 In assessing the power of first-year grades to predict second- and third- 
year grades, it should be noted that one cannot be sure what second- and third-
year grades would look like if clerkships were not decided before these grades 
are handed out. One possibility is that students who do not receive clerkships 
(or who, having received mediocre first-year grades, know that they will not 
receive clerkships) may throw in the towel and stop trying. Another possibility 
is that students who get clerkships may decide that their future is set and thus 
that they need not try any more. Either phenomenon would distort second- and 
third-year grades relative to first-year grades; second- and third-year grades 
would be a less clear measure of “legal ability.” They may also be a less clear 
measure because of strategic course selection by students. A thought 
provoking implication of these suggestions is that judges who wait longer to 
hire their clerks may be “fooled” by the high second- and third-year grades of 
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those not hired earlier, as those grades may be artificially inflated by less 
exertion of effort by students who receive clerkships early and by strategic 
course selection. But in fact slacking off and strategic course selection by 
students who do not get clerkships seem more likely; students who get 
clerkships, or at least students who get the most prestigious clerkships, are 
likely to care about grades for other reasons (graduation honors, Supreme 
Court clerkships, positions in legal academia), which will give them reason not 
to slack off. 
 Early hiring does not impose unambiguous costs on the parties. While 
less information will be available, risk-averse parties will enjoy some benefit 
from resolving uncertainty earlier and, in effect, insuring themselves against 
the possibility that things will turn out badly for them.19 (For students, things 
could turn out badly if their law school careers do not progress in the way they 
might hope; for judges, things could turn out badly if they end up being 
unattractive to students for some reason.) The economics literature on 
matching shows that with risk-averse parties, early hiring may sometimes 
create benefits.20 But in other similar contexts we do not seem to think that 
early transactions for insurance purposes produce a better outcome; for 
instance, no one argues that students should be admitted to college based on 
sixth-grade test scores in order to “insure” students against not turning out as 
well as they might hope or colleges against being less attractive than they 
might otherwise be. It is equally unclear why such insurance would on balance 
be desirable in the clerkship setting.  
 
 3. Maximizing the “production of justice.” 
 Until now the efficiency discussion has focused on the well-being of 
the parties to the clerkship match—judges and students. The emphasis has 
been on achieving “good,” or desirable, matches from their perspective. 
Another conception of efficiency focuses on the overall quality of the legal 
system—whether the law clerk market maximizes the “production of justice” 
(however defined). This question can be rephrased: Is failing to match the 
most desired clerkship candidates to the most desired judges—that is, failing to 
match in accordance with the parties’ preferences—a bad thing or a good thing 
from the perspective of maximizing the “production of justice”? 
 If the quality of judicial output is an additive function of judges’ and 
clerks’ ability, then the matching does not matter, holding constant the 
aggregate pool of clerks hired. If, instead, the output quality of relatively less 
desired judges benefits from the input of top clerks more than the output 
quality of relatively more desired judges does, then “mismatches” are actually 
                                                                 
19 See Li & Rosen, supra note 10. 
20 See id. 
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good for societal welfare. Finally, if the quality of judicial output is a 
multiplicative function of judges’ ability (measured by attractiveness to 
applicants) and clerks’ ability, then “mismatches” are likely to reduce societal 
welfare. There are other factors as well; for instance, a top law clerk may 
benefit more from the coaching of a more desirable judge, and this may 
produce broader benefits for society as the clerk goes out and pursues his or 
her own career. A further effect may be that the matching process may affect 
students’ incentives to put in effort to become able in the first place. All in all, 
it turns out to be quite difficult to say how mismatches affect the overall 
quality of the legal system. For this reason, we give primary emphasis below 
to the criterion of maximizing the satisfaction of judges and clerks with the 
match. 
 
C. Perceived fairness. 
 Judges and students may care not only about the match that results 
from the law clerk hiring process but also about the nature of the experience 
itself. Even if Judge A and student B are quite happy to be paired with one 
another at the end of the road, if the process of getting to that point was 
unpleasant, the market may still cause disutility and, thus, may be suboptimal. 
 We have already discussed judges’ distaste for the law clerk hiring 
process. (See section A.) Our survey results suggest that students may have 
similar or even stronger feelings. We focus below on a particular form of 
disutility on students’ part: since it is hard for participants in this market to get 
good information about one another, various forms of personal well-
connectedness may come to play a large role, and students (as well as judges) 
may perceive this to be unfair. We discuss evidence along these lines in Part II. 
  
II.  Empirical Results 
A. A brief history of the law clerk market.  
 To understand the story told by our empirical evidence from judges 
and students, it is helpful first to understand what has gone before. The history 
of the market for federal judicial law clerks and the attempts to reform it have 
been described well and fully by others, so we offer only the barest essentials 
here.21   
 Over the past several decades, the time of hiring of law clerks has 
moved from the end of the third year of law school to the beginning or 
middle of the second year. Judge Wald writes of her experience, “I was hired 
in 1951 as a clerk to Second Circuit Judge Jerome Frank in May of my third 
                                                                 
21 For a full account through 1994, see Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra 
note 8, at 208-221. 
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year.”22 During the most recent hiring season, by contrast, the process was 
well underway by mid-fall of the second year, as documented in Part 
III.C.1.b below.  
 Each stage in the backward progression in the time of hiring of 
federal judicial law clerks has been marked by a belief that the market will 
never move earlier than the present moment—that the process has reached a 
“natural stopping point” beyond which it will not move. Judge Kozinski, 
writing in 1991, provides an example: 
 [T]he breakpoint for many judges in making clerkship 
decisions comes around February or March of a student’s 
second year of law school. At that time several things come to 
pass. Perhaps most important, the student’s third semester 
grades become available. Also, many students will have 
developed relationships with members of the faculty by 
working as research assistants, participating in individual 
research projects, writing papers or participating in seminars. 
By that time as well, students will have had a fair opportunity 
to show commitment to their law reviews by participating in 
the editing process or doing substantial work toward 
publication of their comments. For those of us who care about 
such things—and there are many—law review board elections 
are conducted around that time.23 
Of course, hiring has now moved to a point well before Judge Kozinski’s 
“breakpoint.”  
 The past two decades have witnessed a parade of attempted reforms of 
the market for federal judicial law clerks. These reforms have had in common 
their inability to solve the problem. The average life of a reform has been 
about three years.24 The latest reform effort, begun in 1993, involved the 
imposition of a March 1 start date and initially appeared promising to its 
sponsors, who stated hopefully after its first year of operation that although 
“[w]e entertain no illusions that the March 1 Solution is perfect, . . . we 
respectfully submit that, like democracy with all its flaws, it is the best system 
that anyone has conceived thus far.”25 However, it was this very reform that 
the Judicial Conference abandoned in 1998 after an acknowledgement that it 
was “not universally followed and, therefore, … not an accurate reflection of 
                                                                 
22 See Wald, supra note 2, at 155.  
23 Kozinski, supra note 1, at 1710. 
24 See Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 209-15 (describing five 
failed reform efforts over the period from 1978 to 1991); infra text 
accompanying note 87 (describing the abandonment of the sixth, most recent 
reform attempt, begun in 1993, in September of 1998). 
25 Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 222. 
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the practice in the courts.”26 
 Thus, for the last two years, there has been no official Judicial 
Conference policy governing the hiring of federal judicial law clerks. In the 
first year after the abandonment of the March 1 start date, some law schools 
attempted to enforce a February 1 start date for sending application materials, 
including faculty recommendations, to judges, but these efforts were largely 
abandoned the following year (as well as somewhat ignored in the year in 
which they were nominally in effect). To learn more about what is presently 
happening in the market for federal judicial law clerks, we surveyed both 
judges and students about the process. 
 
B. Survey design and response. 
 1. Survey of Supreme Court Justices. 
 In October of 1999 we sent a letter to the nine active Supreme Court 
Justices asking about their law clerk hiring practices and how these might 
relate to the hiring practices of other federal judges. The letter came from the 
judge author of the present work (Posner) and promised confidentiality to the 
Justices. Eight of the nine members of the Court responded. We discuss their 
responses in connection with our analysis of possible reforms of the law clerk 
market and the potential role of the Supreme Court in enforcing these reforms. 
 
 2. Surveys of Court of Appeals judges.  
 In September of 1999 and again in June of 2000 we distributed a 
survey about law clerk hiring to all federal Court of Appeals judges. The judge 
author of this article (Posner) mailed the surveys to all active and senior 
judges.27 For confidentiality reasons we requested that the judges return their 
responses to another of us (Jolls) rather than to him; also, we did not ask for 
respondents’ names, but we did ask for the judge’s court (First Circuit, Second 
Circuit, etc.) and the general timeframe in which the judge was appointed, and 
from this information it would be possible to identify some judges. We 
therefore assured judges that identifying information would be shielded from 
the judge author of this work as well as kept confidential from the public at 
large. The 1999 and 2000 surveys were quite similar, although the 2000 
version included a few new questions. 
                                                                 
26 Official Report of the Sept. 1998 Meeting of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States. 
27 A small number of senior Court of Appeals judges from the Seventh 
Circuit were not surveyed because the sender of the survey (Posner), a Judge 
on that Circuit, knew that they were no longer hiring law clerks. 
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 The 1999 survey yielded 155 responses from judges, a 65% response 
rate. Of the responses, 103 were from active judges, while 51 were from senior 
judges (one respondent did not specify seniority). This is almost an exact 
match to the overall proportion of active judges versus senior judges on the 
bench (161 active, 77 senior), as shown in Table A1 in the attached Data 
Appendix. The 2000 survey yielded a similar, although slightly lower, 
response rate of 54%, perhaps because some judges were disinclined to bother 
responding a second time. Again the pattern of responses from active and 
senior judges (84 and 45 responses respectively) was almost an exact match to 
the overall proportion of active judges versus senior judges on the bench 
(again see Table A1). Across individual circuits there was somewhat greater, 
although not enormous, variation in the response rates, as summarized in Table 
A1. All surveys that were returned to us were assigned numbers, and these are 
what we use to identify particular responses that we quote or rely upon. 
 As is obvious from the description just given, our judge data embrace 
only federal appellate judges; they do not include information on federal 
District Court judges. While it is true that some of the most elite federal 
District Court judges probably compete with federal Court of Appeals judges 
for clerks, the number of such plausible competitors is sufficiently limited, 
relative to the overall size of the pool of federal District Court judges, to justify 
the limitation of the distribution of our survey to federal appellate judges. 
 
 3. Surveys of students. 
 In surveying students about the law clerk market, we faced a scope 
problem similar to, although vastly greater in magnitude than, the problem 
faced for judges. Having decided to focus on federal appellate judges, our 
interest on the student side was in students who were potential candidates for 
clerkships with such judges. At some level, though, that group includes every 
law student in the country, since students serving in federal appellate 
clerkships hail from an extraordinary number of schools ranging from Detroit 
Mercy to St. John’s University to Louisiana State to Harvard.28 Because it was 
obviously impracticable to survey every student at every law school in the 
country, we were forced to make choices about how to narrow the group. One 
approach, which was the approach taken in the only existing survey of 
clerkship candidates of which we are aware, is to limit the sample to students 
serving on the main law review at one of some suitably defined set of “very 
good” schools (say, schools in the top ten or twenty).29 The second approach, 
which is the one we adopted, involves surveying all students, not just members 
of the main law review, at an even smaller number of schools. 
                                                                 
28 See Judicial Yellow Book, Spring 2000, at 52, 58, 81, 83 (listing these 
schools as the alma mater of federal appellate clerks). 
29 See Rhinehart, supra note 8, at 577-78 & n.12. 
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 Two empirical factors support our focus on all students, not just 
members of the main law review, at a smaller number of schools. First, 
membership in a school’s main law review does not appear to be of overriding 
or even particularly great importance in the selection process of Court of 
Appeals judges. Our 2000 judge survey asked judges to rank the following 
eight factors in order of their importance to the judges’ law clerk hiring 
decisions: law school grades, recommendations from familiar professors, 
recommendations from other professors, recommendations from past legal 
employers, recommendations from current clerks and other “peers,” 
membership in the school’s main law review, board position at the school’s 
main law review, and writing sample. (We did not ask judges to rank the 
importance of the personal interview because it seemed likely to be of 
substantial importance to almost all of them.) Table A2 in the Data Appendix 
summarizes the rankings given to membership in the school’s main law 
review. Over half of the judges who provided rankings (55 of 109; seven 
judges simply indicated that such membership was a factor without specifying 
its importance) said that membership in the main law review was either in the 
bottom half of factors in terms of importance or was not a factor in their 
decisions at all. Only six judges said that such membership was the most 
important of the eight factors to their decisions.  
 The second empirical factor that supports looking at all law students 
at a smaller number of schools as opposed to only members of the main law 
review at a larger number of schools is that students from the four law 
schools generally considered to be the most competitive (Chicago, Harvard, 
Stanford, and Yale in alphabetical order) strongly dominate students from the 
remaining top ten and top twenty schools in their success in landing federal 
appellate clerkships. (For the top ten and the top twenty lists, we use the 
(admittedly controversial) U.S. News and World Report rankings. Harvard, 
Stanford, and Yale are the top three schools according to this ranking; 
Chicago is sixth.) 
 Table A3 in the Data Appendix presents the number of students from 
each group of schools serving in federal appellate clerkships according to 
data from the most recent edition of the Judicial Yellow Book. It is important 
to emphasize at the outset the limitations of these data: they cover only those 
judges who choose to report their clerks’ schools (approximately one-third 
do not report), and, much more importantly, the variations in reporting rates 
across circuits are substantial. As a result of the latter point, the numbers in 
Table A3 are probably understated (relatively speaking) for the California 
schools, including Stanford, as well as the Universities of Pennsylvania and 
Texas, and probably overstated for Chicago, New York University, and 
Columbia; the reason is that the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits (covering 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and California respectively) have (along with the 
Eighth Circuit) the lowest rates of coverage in the Judicial Yellow Book (with 
percentages ranging from 42% to 63%), while the Second and Seventh 
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Circuits (covering New York and Chicago respectively) have much higher 
coverage rates (81% for the Second Circuit, 87% for the Seventh Circuit). 
 Despite the limitations of the Judicial Yellow Book data, Table A3, 
coupled with the information in Table A2, provides support for the approach 
of looking comprehensively at the very top tier of schools instead of looking 
only at members of the main law review at a somewhat broader set of 
institutions. Students from Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale held 143 
clerkships (an average of 36 per school), compared to 93 for students from 
the next six schools (an average of 16 per school) and 68 for students from 
the remaining ten of the top twenty institutions (an average of 7 per school). 
Note that what is relevant for our purposes is the absolute representation of 
the schools, not how they fare relative to their student body sizes, since our 
goal is to get information from the largest absolute number of potential 
federal appellate law clerks. 
 The remainder of this section provides further detail on how we 
conducted our student surveys. 
 
  a. 2000 survey of second-year students. 
 In February of 2000 we distributed surveys about the 1999-2000 law 
clerk hiring process to all second-year students at Chicago, Harvard, 
Stanford, and Yale. Surveys were placed in student mailboxes, and students 
were provided with a stamped, pre-addressed envelope in which to return 
their responses to one of us (Jolls). Students were assured that no potentially 
identifying information in their responses would be revealed publicly or even 
to the judge author of this work. Students were not asked to put their names 
on their responses. 
 We received a total of 294 responses, a 26% response rate. 
Presumably the lower response rate for students than for federal appellate 
judges reflected the fact that while almost all appellate judges hire law 
clerks, many law students do not apply for federal appellate clerkships. We 
received 129 responses from students who applied for federal appellate 
clerkships (and 165 from students who did not; students were asked to return 
the survey either way), but since we do not know the actual number of 
students who applied for these positions, we cannot calculate a response rate 
for the 129 responses. As with the judge surveys, all 2000 second-year 
student surveys returned to us were assigned numbers, which are used to 
identify the surveys below. 
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b. 1999 survey of second-year students 
 In March of 1999 we distributed surveys to all second-year students 
at the four law schools surveyed in 2000 and also to all second-year students 
at three additional schools, Columbia, Michigan, and Vanderbilt. In contrast 
to the 2000 student survey, which sought mostly quantitative or categorical 
information (for instance, “in what month did you apply?”, “how many 
interviews did you do?”), the 1999 survey was largely anecdotal, with mostly 
open-ended essay or long-answer questions. This survey, administered just as 
our project was getting underway, provided a natural starting point for our 
research. 
 The survey was distributed by multiple means. At schools other than 
Harvard, it was left in students’ mailboxes with instructions to return 
responses to a drop box at a specified location; at some of these schools the 
survey was also distributed via electronic mail. At Harvard the survey was 
left in students’ mailboxes, again with instructions to return responses to a 
drop box; in addition some students received copies of the survey in their 
large “bundled” classes. As with the 2000 survey, students were not asked 
for their names and were assured of the confidentiality of any possibly 
identifying information. 30 
 We received a total of 337 responses to the 1999 survey. Table A4 in 
the Data Appendix provides a breakdown by school and by whether the 
respondent applied for federal judicial clerkships. (In 1999 we asked whether 
the student had applied for federal judicial clerkships, appellate or trial level; 
in 2000 we asked whether the student had applied for federal appellate 
clerkships specifically. Also, for 2000 we do not have data by school because 
one school objected to having school identification on the survey in 2000.) In 
the interest of consistency with the 2000 results, we focus our analysis of the 
1999 data on the four schools surveyed in 2000; thus information from the 
1999 surveys reported below is from the surveys distributed at Chicago, 
Harvard, Stanford, and Yale. These schools accounted for 267 of the 337 
responses (79%) (see Table A4). As above, we assigned an identifying 
number to each response.  
 As just noted, our 2000 survey of second-year students asked whether 
the student had applied for federal appellate clerkships, and only students who 
had done so were directed to fill out the body of the survey; the 1999 survey 
asked whether the student had applied for federal appellate or trial level 
clerkships, and only those who had done so were directed to fill out the body 
of the survey. In both cases, however, some of the responses by students in the 
                                                                 
30 At the time of the 1999 student survey, one of us (Posner) had not yet 
become involved in the project. We interpreted the confidentiality promise to 
students as requiring that no one other than the original three authors (Avery, 
Jolls, and Roth) see any potentially identifying information. 
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body of the survey may relate to state court applications or (for the 2000 
survey) federal trial level applications, even though those were not embraced 
in the opening question, because the students may have applied for those 
positions in addition to the ones embraced in the opening question. Obviously 
we could have chosen to limit subsequent questions (such as “When was your 
first interview?”, “When was your first offer of a clerkship?”, and “Did you 
receive other clerkship offers before you rejected your first offer?”) to the 
category of clerkships embraced in the opening question, but this could have 
produced misleading or incomplete answers, since other opportunities 
certainly might have affected the student’s situation in the market for the 
clerkships covered in the opening question. Nonetheless, the cost of our 
approach is that the data presented below, while only for students who applied 
for some sort of federal clerkship—and for 2000 only for students who applied 
for federal appellate clerkships—may reflect events in other markets as well.  
 
  c. The role of third-year students. 
 There is a widespread perception (which we shared prior to receiving 
the contrary results from our judge survey) that the early time at which 
clerkship hiring occurs has significantly increased the frequency of hiring of 
third-year students, making our focus on second-year students potentially 
problematic. Dean Anthony Kronman of Yale Law School wrote to the Yale 
student body about the subject of third-year applications in the fall of 1999, 
saying that he “suspect[ed] that third-year applications will become 
increasingly routine” and that he “regard[ed] this development as a healthy 
one.”31 Students would work at a law firm or pursue some other opportunity 
for a year after finishing law school and then begin a clerkship. 
 The responses to our judge survey suggest, however, that judges have 
not intensified their hiring of third-year students in response to the 
developments in the clerkship market since the 1998 abandonment of the 
March 1 start date. In our 2000 judge survey we asked how many third-year 
students, and also how many post-graduates (candidates who had finished 
law school), judges hired in 1999-2000 and whether these numbers were 
greater than, less than, or the same as the numbers in previous years. 
Answers are presented in Table A5 in the Data Appendix. No discernible 
trend toward increased hiring of third-year students (or post-graduates) 
appears in this data. 
  
                                                                 
31 Memorandum from Anthony Kronman to the students of Yale Law 
School, Dec. 8, 1999. 
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C. Is the law clerk market functioning well? 
 Our survey results allow us to assess the functioning of the market for 
federal judicial law clerks within the normative framework developed in Part I 
above. We first discuss findings related to the efficiency of the clerk hiring 
process and then turn to findings that bear on disillusionment with the federal 
bench and the perceived fairness of the clerk hiring process. 
 
 1. Efficiency: Maximizing the “sum of satisfaction” of judges and 
  clerks with the match. 
 Part I.B above discussed two separate efficiency criteria for assessing the 
workings of the law clerk market: maximizing the “sum of satisfaction” of 
judges and clerks with the match, and maximizing the “production of justice.” 
Our survey results do not shed light on the second criterion (which we 
concluded was less useful in any event), but they have much to say about the 
first. 
 
  a. The nature of the process. 
  We first consider the ways in which the nature of the law clerk hiring 
process impedes maximizing the “sum of satisfaction” of judges and clerks 
with the match. The biggest problem is that, as noted above, the process does 
not permit judges and clerks to consider a range of alternatives before making 
their decisions.  
 Our survey results provide strong quantitative evidence of the inability 
to consider a range of options on both sides of this market. The results show in 
a systematic way how the clerkship market resolves extraordinarily quickly, 
with judges and students pairing off in an almost frenetic fashion to avoid 
being left in the cold. The basic chronology, as described more fully below, is 
that  
  · interviews lead very quickly to offers (section i below);  
  · offers produce very quick responses (section ii);  
  · responses are generally acceptances (section iii); and  
  · many scheduled interviews are canceled as a result (section iv).  
Thus, students and judges tend to pair off quickly with those with whom they 
have early interviews. As a result,  
  · many students limit the judges to whom they apply to avoid being  
   paired off early with a less preferred judge (section v); and  
  · at least some students who might otherwise be interested in  
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   clerking avoid the process entirely (section vi). 
 
   i. First step:  interviews lead quickly to offers. 
 The time between interviews and offers is typically very short, as revealed 
by responses to our 2000 survey of second-year students. (We did not ask 
about the gap between interview and offer times in our 1999 survey.) As 
shown in Table 1, over half of students’ first offers of clerkships were made 
within two days of the offering judge’s interview of the student; 34% were 
made at the conclusion of the interview.  
 
Table 1: Length of Time Between First Offer and  
Interview with the Offering Judge, 1999-2000 
Time between first offer and interview with the offering 
judge 
Percent of 
responding 
students 
Offer made at end of interview 34% 
1-2 days elapsed between interview and offer 23% 
3-4 days elapsed between interview and offer 9% 
5-7 days elapsed between interview and offer  15% 
1-2 weeks elapsed between interview and offer 8% 
More than 2 weeks elapsed between interview and offer 11% 
 
Total number of responses: 101a 
 Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey. 
a 2000 Second-Year Survey #23 did not answer the question about the time elapsed 
between the student’s first offer and the interview with the offering judge, even 
though this student reported receiving an offer of a clerkship. Therefore we have 101 
responses for this question, versus 102 responses for a number of the questions 
discussed below. 
 
 Moreover, our survey results show that the judge who makes the 
student’s first offer typically comes early in the student’s interview schedule, 
as reported in Table 2. In other words, it is not ordinarily the case that students 
interview with a range of judges and then receive their first offer. As the table 
shows, 59% of first offers came from the first or second judge with whom the 
student interviewed, and 36% came from the first judge with whom the student 
interviewed. 
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Table 2: Interview Producing First Offer, 1999-2000 
Interviewing producing first offer Percent of responding 
studentsa 
First interview produced first offer 36% 
Second interview produced first offer 23% 
Third interview produced first offer 19% 
Fourth interview produced first offer 8% 
Fifth or subsequent interview produced first offer 15% 
 
Total number of responses: 102 
 Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey. 
 a Percentages in this column sum to 101% as a consequence of rounding. 
 
 Responses to our judge surveys in 1999 and 2000 also suggest limited 
time between interviews and offers. As Table 3 shows, approximately three-
quarters of active judges started making offers to candidates before they had 
completed their scheduled interviews. 
 
Table 3: The Practice of Making Offers Before  
Completing Scheduled Interviews  
Percent of responding judges who began making 
offers before completing their scheduled 
interviews 
Group of federal 
appellate judges 
1998-1999 1999-2000 
All judges 
Active judges 
Senior judges 
Senior status not listed 
64% 
74% 
38% 
0% 
 
Total number of 
responses: 
138 
64% 
73% 
42% 
N/A 
 
Total number of 
responses: 
114 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
 
 The reasons for the speed of offer behavior are not difficult to 
understand. In both 1999 and 2000 we asked judges why they made offers 
before completing interviews, and many of their explanations explicitly 
mentioned the fear of losing candidates to other judges. In 1999, 76 of the 88 
responding judges who started making offers before the completion of 
  
 
 
 
22 
scheduled interviews offered reasons for this behavior, and 42% of those who 
offered reasons specifically mentioned competition from other judges. These 
judges’ specific responses are listed in Table A6 of the Data Appendix. The 
situation in 2000 was similar; 54 of the 73 responding judges who had started 
making offers before the completion of scheduled interviews gave their reason 
for this choice, and one-third of those who offered reasons specifically 
mentioned the fear of losing candidates to other judges. Again these judges’ 
specific responses are listed in Table A6. Putting both years together, only a 
single judge mentioned the desire to save time (by not conducting further 
interviews) as the reason for making offers before the completion of scheduled 
interviews, while 50 gave competition from rivals as the reason. In response to 
a different question on our judge survey, over half of responding judges in 
both 1999 and 2000 said that competition influenced the time at which offers 
were made, as reported in the top panel in Table 4 below. As described in 
sections ii and iii below, offers typically lead to quick responses, which are 
generally acceptances, so making an early offer tends to give a judge a 
competitive edge. 
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Table 4: Facts About Judges’ Motivations for Early Offers  
Percent of responding judges  
1998-1999 1999-2000 
Competition influenced the time 
at which offers were made 
All judges 
Active judges 
Senior judges  
 
 
 
 
52% 
59% 
40% 
 
Total number of 
responses:  
140 
 
 
53% 
63% 
30% 
 
Total number of 
responses: 
111 
An applicant requested that the 
timetable be moved upa 
All judges 
Active judges 
Senior judges 
 
 
 
 
 
Timetable was moved up in 
response to applicant’s requesta 
All judges 
Active judges 
Senior judges 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 
 
 
46% 
53% 
31% 
 
Total number of 
responses: 
115 
 
 
 
48% 
48% 
50% 
 
Total number of 
responses: 
52 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
a These questions were only asked in 2000. 
 
 In many instances, judges who made quick offers may have been 
responding to explicit requests by students to speed up their timetables. Our 
2000 judge survey showed that 53% of active judges reported that an applicant 
had asked them to speed up the process because of a pending interview or offer 
deadline from another judge, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 4. (We did 
not ask a similar question in 1999.) Almost half of those who received such a 
request moved up their timetables, also as shown in the bottom panel in Table 
4. 
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   ii.  Second step: offers lead quickly to responses. 
 Not only do interviews lead quickly to offers, but offers lead quickly 
to responses; this is not a market in which students collect a substantial 
number of offers and then make their decisions. As Table 5 shows, almost 
three-quarters of students responded to their first offer of a clerkship within 
two days of receiving the offer. (This information is from the 2000 survey. 
We did not ask a parallel question in 1999.) Clearly this is a market in which 
events move very quickly with little apparent time to consider multiple 
options. Indeed, 42% of students responded to their first offer immediately. 
 
Table 5: Timing of Student Response to First Clerkship Offer, 1999-2000 
Time before 
responding to first 
offer 
Percent of responding students 
(cumulative percentages in parenthesis) 
Immediate response 42% (42%) 
Within 2 days 30% (71%)a 
3 days to 1 week 21% (92%) 
More than 1 week 8% (100%) 
 
Total number of responses: 102 
Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey. 
a The cumulative percentage of 71% does not equal the sum of 42% 
and 30% as a consequence of rounding. 
  
 The reasons for the quick response times by students are again easy to 
understand. Most obviously, many judges impose explicit response deadlines 
at the time an offer is made. Among respondents to our 2000 judge survey, 
25% reported requiring an answer within one day for one or more of their 
slots. 38% reported requiring an answer within 48 hours, and 69% reported 
requiring an answer within a week. These numbers are similar to, although 
slightly higher than, the corresponding numbers from 1999, as shown on Table 
6. (An earlier survey of judges by the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts found still more dramatic results regarding the time to respond to 
offers: “Almost one in six [judges] stated that students should have to respond 
on the spot.”32) Student responses colorfully revealed the practice of limited-
response-time offers, as shown in Table 7. At least one student attempted 
unsuccessfully to gain additional time from a judge: “I asked for 24 hrs. to 
consult my wife, but [the judge] said he couldn’t give me 24 hrs. I guaranteed 
                                                                 
32 See Louis F. Oberdorfer & Michael N. Levy, Clerkship Selection: A Reply 
To The Bad Apple, 101 YALE L.J. 1097, 1102 n.18 (1992). 
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him I would accept.”33  
 
Table 6: Time-Limited Offers As Reported By Judges 
Percent of responding judges Time within which 
response to offer 
required 
1998-1999 1999-2000 
Within 24 hours 22% 25% 
Within 48 hours 34% 38% 
Within a week 67% 
 
69% 
 Total number of 
responses: 
 108 
Total number of 
responses: 
85 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
 
                                                                 
33 1999 Student Survey #157.  
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Table 7: Time-Limited Offers As Experienced By Students 
Survey Comment 
1999 Survey 
#154a 
A Ninth Circuit judge in California made clerkship offers good for 
only fifteen minutes. 
1999 Survey 
#105 
[A particular judge] made an offer on the spot with no time to 
decide. 
1999 Survey 
#159 
[A particular judge] gave [me] 1.5 hours to decide after being 
given an offer. 
2000 Survey 
#244 
[A particular judge] wanted an answer on the spot. 
1999 Survey 
#118 
[A particular judge] extended an offer only until the next morning. 
1999 Survey 
#108 
[My] second choice judge g[a]ve an exploding offer on the phone 
(i.e., I had to give an answer by the time I hung up) before [I was] 
able to call/talk to my first choice judge. 
2000 Survey 
#247 
I had to respond [to a particular judge’s offer] by the next 
morning. 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Second-Year Student Surveys. 
a This response took the form of a newspaper editorial that the student had written 
about the market for federal judicial law clerks. 
 
Even when an offer does not explicitly expire after only a very short 
period, a variety of implicit pressures operate to press for a speedy response 
by the student. To begin, some judges make offers to more candidates than 
they have slots available, with the slots going to the first candidates to 
accept. Not surprisingly, “[u]sually the clerk applicant accepts on the spot.”34 
Interestingly, this sort of strategy is explicitly prohibited by the Harvard Law 
School Office of Career Services for law firms interviewing Harvard Law 
School students.35   
                                                                 
34 1999 Judge Survey #106. A similar strategy was used in hiring economics 
professors at Ohio State University in 1970. The university “was authorized to 
fill six positions, and it made offers to 11 candidates, saying that the offer 
would remain open only until the first six acceptances were received.” Roth & 
Xing, supra note 3, at 1036 n.78. 
35 See Harvard Law School Office of Career Services 1999 Rules and 
Regulations for Organizations Interviewing Harvard Law Students (“No offer 
shall be made conditional upon a student’s accepting it before acceptances 
have been received from other students to whom offers have also been 
made.”). 
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In addition, many students may feel the need to respond to an offer 
quickly if they think there is some chance they would want to accept because 
a delayed acceptance might start the relationship off on the wrong foot. 
I had an offer from one judge that I had to respond to during a 
short period of time, but I was still waiting to hear from my 
top choice. My top choice called me half an hour before my 
deadline with the other judge. I was worried that the first 
judge would be offended that I waited so long to respond to 
his offer.36 
[A particular judge] [m]entioned how, if he were to give an 
offer to someone and they didn’t immediately accept, it would 
make him wonder if he had made the right choice and 
‘almost’ ma[k]e him want to withdraw it—but he said he 
didn’t do that, said he might give a little time.37 
I was frustrated that my top choice judge hadn’t even started 
interviewing when I got my offer. I felt my only choice was to 
take the offer, as [I] couldn’t make the [offering] judge wait 2 
weeks on the chance that I might get an offer [from the other 
judge].38 
The following striking anecdote suggests that the perception about negative 
impressions from a delay followed by an acceptance or attempted acceptance 
is likely to be correct for at least some judges: 
I have an interview scheduled with my most preferred judge 
([Judge C]) on [later date]. [Judge D] calls and wants me to 
interview on [earlier date]. I ask [Judge D] when she would be 
making her offers, and she says, “I am going to wait until after 
I finish all the interviews, talk with my clerks and then 
decide—so [after the later date of the Judge C interview].” So, 
I go to interview with [Judge D] on [earlier date]. I explain 
that I have another interview scheduled on [later date] during 
the interview. She calls me on [date prior to later date of 
Judge C interview] with an offer. I like [Judge D], but have 
my heart set on at least getting to interview with [Judge C]. 
Because [Judge D] is not willing to wait until at least [later 
date], I decline saying I would like to interview further before 
making my decision. [Judge D] gets fairly offended and says, 
                                                                 
36 1999 Student Survey #131.  
37 1999 Student Survey #50.  
38 2000 Student Survey #12.  
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“you know, students should withdraw right after the interview 
if they are not going to accept an offer.”39  
The perception that one is “obliged to accept every offer”40 is part of the 
reason that, as explained in the following section, students overwhelmingly 
respond not only quickly but affirmatively upon receiving a clerkship offer. 
 
   iii. Third step: responses to offers are generally  
    acceptances—even when other positions would be  
    preferred. 
 A significant majority (73%) of students responding to our 2000 
survey of second-year students accepted the first offer they received, as shown 
in Table 8. (We did not ask a parallel question in the 1999 survey.) Consistent 
with this evidence—and presumably in large part because of it—almost 70% 
of students who received one or more clerkship offers received exactly one, 
also as shown in Table 8. Once again, the law clerk market does not appear to 
be one in which students have the opportunity to consider a range of options 
before making their decisions. 
                                                                 
39 1999 Student Survey #135.  
40 Id. 
  
 
 
 
29 
Table 8: The Practice of Accepting the First Offer Received, 1999-2000 
Offer information Percent of responding 
students 
Cumulative 
percentage 
First offer was accepted (of the 
102 students who responded to 
this question) 
Yes 
No 
 
 
 
73% 
27% 
 
 
 
73% 
100% 
Number of offers (of the 101 
students who responded to this 
question and received one or 
more offers)a 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
 
 
 
68% 
25% 
3% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
 
 
 
 
68% 
93% 
96% 
98% 
99% 
100% 
Source:  2000 Second-Year Student Survey. 
a 2000 Second-Year Survey #12 did not indicate the number of offers received but 
did answer the question about whether the first offer was accepted; thus we have 
101 responses here compared to 102 above. 
 
 One might respond at this point that students’ first offers may often 
come from their top-choice judges, so that the inability to consider other 
options is of little consequence for them. Students certainly have some control 
over the timing of their interviews, and thus (one might argue) they can 
arrange to interview first with their top-choice judges. It is clear that at least 
some students attempt to engage in such behavior; as one student wrote in 
response to our 1999 survey, 
Throughout the process I . . . strategize[d] and manipulate[d] . . 
. not answering the telephone for fear of being trapped into a 
less-than-ideal interview early on, and trying to arrange 
interviews strategically . . . .41 
The question is how widespread and, more importantly, how successful these 
efforts prove to be. 
 One difficulty in scheduling interviews strategically, so as to meet top-
choice judges first, is that prior to interviewing with a number of judges, 
students may well not know who their top choices are. (And, of course, the 
same goes for judges.) As one student wrote, “[T]he ability to research the 
                                                                 
41 1999 Student Survey #112.  
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federal judiciary in advance so that you know exactly for whom you would 
and would not accept an offer is impossible. What is the point of the interview 
on the students’ side if it can’t be used to further screen for [judge] quality?”42 
 But even given their limited information, our 2000 student survey 
results make clear that students are not able to arrange their interviews 
optimally so that an early offer comes from what they regard (based on the 
limited information they have) as their top-choice judge. As reported in Table 
9, in only about one-third of cases was a student’s first offer from what the 
student perceived to be his or her top-choice judge. Yet, as the table shows, 
58% of students who received their first offer from a judge who was not their 
top choice nonetheless accepted that offer. Indeed, correlating these results 
with the earlier results about the timing of acceptance, 26% of these candidates 
accepted the offer from the non-top-choice judge immediately! (This last result 
is not shown on the table.) The results in Table 9 are even more striking since 
one might expect cognitive dissonance to push students toward the ex post 
belief that the offers they received or accepted were more desirable than they 
otherwise might have been thought to be. 
                                                                 
42 1999 Student Survey #135.  
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Table 9: Desirability of and Response to a Student’s First Offer,  
1999-2000 
Desirability of and response to first offer Percent of responding students 
First offer was first choice position  
Of the 102 students who responded 
to this question: 
Yes 
No 
 
First offer was accepted 
Of the 35 students for whom first 
offer was first choice position: 
Yes 
No 
 
Of the 67 students for whom first 
offer was not first choice position: 
Yes 
No 
 
 
 
34% 
66% 
 
 
 
 
100% 
0% 
 
 
 
58% 
42% 
Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey. 
 
 The results reported in Table 9 are consistent with related evidence 
from our 1999 student survey. That year we asked students to rank the judges 
with whom they got interviews from most to least preferred and then asked 
them to list the lowest judge from whom they would have accepted an offer if 
they had not yet heard back from more preferred judges. 96% of respondents 
would have accepted an offer from a judge in the lower half of their list rather 
than wait for their other scheduled interviews. 44% would have accepted an 
offer from their least preferred judge. The point is not that a clerkship with the 
least preferred judge would be an undesirable outcome in an absolute sense (if 
no other options were available), but that many students are apparently willing 
to forego any chance at the range of more attractive options to avoid losing the 
certain opportunity with the least preferred judge. Although the 1999 question, 
unlike the question from the 2000 survey, has a hypothetical element, it 
indicates strongly that students will accept offers from less preferred judges 
even when they are awaiting scheduled interviews with more preferred judges. 
 As with the practice of speedy responses to the first offer, the reasons 
for the likelihood of acceptance of the first offer are easy to understand. To 
begin, many students may fear that declining an offer is an affront to the judge, 
as already noted. This fear may result among other things from pressure 
exerted by law professors, who are repeat players with institut ional interests 
and who may feel that immediate acceptances from their school’s students 
enhance the chances for students from that school the following year. Judge 
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Becker, then-Judge Breyer and then-Dean Calabresi bemoan “the 
‘conventional wisdom’ propagated in many law schools that applicants are 
obliged to accept the first offer tendered,” a state of affairs that the authors 
“find . . . inexplicable and indefensible.”43 But institutional interests may 
explain the puzzle; professors may tell students they must or should accept 
immediately even though some judges do not require this because it serves the 
broader interests of the institution over the years. 
 A second critical factor is the strong student aversion to sacrificing a 
“bird in the hand” for uncertain prospects down the road. Many student 
comments, quoted in Table 10, suggest that students often accept less 
preferred positions because they do not know whether they will have other 
options later on. Apparently, accepting an early offer from a less preferred 
judge is preferred to waiting out the market. But obviously it may mean that 
students miss out on the chance to match with preferred judges who may be 
extremely interested in them. 
                                                                 
43 Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 223. 
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Table 10: The “Bird in the Hand” Rationale for Accepting an 
Early Clerkship Offer 
Survey Comment 
1999 Survey 
#46 
I was made an offer in late January before the majority of my 
judges even started interviewing. I chose to accept the offer with a 
judge who was not in the top ½ rather than take the chance on 
waiting for a more preferred judge to call. 
1999 Survey 
#120 
I was offered an early interview by one judge who, though I knew 
I would be happy clerking for, was not my top choice. I was led to 
believe he might offer a position at the interview. I had a difficult 
time deciding whether to go to the interview (and possibly 
foreclose other options) or cancel (and possibly lose the bird in the 
hand). I went. Got an offer. Accepted. 
1999 Survey 
#164 
[A]t the end I was in Union Station in DC, waiting to get a bus to 
Dulles, [Judge A’s] office had me on hold because they said 
they’d tell me yes/no by [a particular time], and I was missing 
calling back [Judge B], whose offer exploded at [that same time]. 
I ended up calling [Judge B] to ask for more time, but realized 
how rude that would be, so I accepted [Judge B] without knowing 
[Judge A’s] decision. And I missed my plane! 
1999 Survey 
#5 
[W]hile in [southern city] I had received an offer from a district 
court judge (with 24 hours to reply). I checked my messages at 
home and found I had been offered an interview with an appellate 
court judge (I had essentially given up on the appellate court 
market at this time). But I decided just to take the ‘bird in the 
hand.’ 
2000 Survey 
#246 
The day after my offer, I was very interested in the offer, but I 
also wanted to continue interviewing because I wanted more 
information to make [my] decision. However, my judge (the one I 
accepted with) indicated that he would continue to interview and 
might fill my slot. 
2000 Survey 
#247 
I got an offer from a judge who was not my first choice, at the end 
of an interview, and had to respond by the next morning. I had an 
interview with my first choice judge scheduled for the next day. I 
was risk averse and took the exploding offer, but still wonder if I 
did the right thing. 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Second-Year Student Surveys. 
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   iv. Fourth step: subsequent interviews are cancelled. 
 As a result of the speed with which judges and students pair off early 
on, both students and judges end up canceling large numbers of previously 
scheduled interviews. Two-thirds (66%) of the judges responding to our 
2000 survey, and 79% of those responding to our 1999 survey, had at least 
one applicant cancel a scheduled interview, as shown in the bottom panel of 
Table 11. On average, each judge conducted approximately 8 interviews and 
experienced approximately 2 cancellations in each year,44 so approximately 
20% of all scheduled interviews were cancelled by students (2 cancellations 
for every 10 scheduled interviews). These numbers fit nicely with the student 
surveys: as reported in Table 12, almost half of the students responding to 
our 2000 survey reported that they cancelled at least one interview, and a 
total of 161 of 695 scheduled interviews, or 23%, were cancelled by 
students.45 Presumably judges also cancelled at least some interviews (or at 
least one would hope that they did), since, as reported in Table 19 below, a 
substantial number of judges had no clerkship positions left by the time of 
their last scheduled interview. 
 Of course, some cancellations of later interviews may be efficient, as 
when neither judge nor student was at the top of the other’s list, and 
preferred options materialize for both. But, as demonstrated above, at least 
from the student side, early offers often come from non-top-choice judges, 
and so applicants are missing out on the chance to consider what might be 
more preferred alternatives. 
Table 11: Interviews and Student Cancellations As Reported By Judges 
                                                                 
44 These numbers are based on the figures reported in Table 11. The 
calculations assume the mean value for the ranges reported on the actual 
survey (for instance, 1.5 interviews for a judge who chose the “1 to 2” 
option); for the “more than 12” range for interviews conducted, they assume 
a value of 14, and for the “more than 6” range for interviews cancelled, they 
assume a value of 8. 
45 These numbers are based on the figures reported in Table 12. Twenty-
eight students who reported the number of interviews they had scheduled did 
not report the number of interviews they cancelled. This is probably a 
consequence of our wording of the cancellation question, which said “How 
many interviews did you schedule and later cancel when you accepted a 
position?” It seems plausible that students who did not receive any offers did 
not respond to this question. Such students presumably did not cancel any 
interviews. The 23% figure in the text thus reflects the assumption that 
students who responded to the question about the number of interviews 
scheduled but not to the question about the number of cancellations did not 
cancel any scheduled interviews. 
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Percent of responding judges (cumulative 
percentages in parentheses) 
 
1998-1999 1999-2000 
Number of interviews 
conducted 
1 to 3 
4 to 6 
7 to 9 
10 to 12 
More than 12 
 
 
 
8% (8%) 
25% (33%) 
24% (57%) 
25% (82%) 
18% (100%) 
 
Total number of 
responses: 
134 
 
 
16% (16%) 
26% (42%) 
20% (62%) 
16% (78%) 
22% (100%) 
 
Total number of 
responses: 
105 
Number of 
cancellations by 
students 
1 to 2 
3 to 4 
5 to 6 
More than 6 
None 
 
 
 
 
40% (40%) 
21% (61%) 
13% (74%) 
4% (79%)a 
21% (100%) 
 
Total number of 
responses: 
137 
 
 
 
31% (31%) 
21% (52%) 
7% (59%) 
7% (66%) 
34% (100%) 
 
Total number of 
responses: 
113 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
a The cumulative percentage of 79% does not equal the sum of 74% and 4% as a 
consequence of rounding. 
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Table 12: Interviews and Student-Initiated Cancellations, 1999-2000 
 Number of 
responding 
students 
Percent of 
responding 
students 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Number 
of 
interviews 
Number of inter- 
views scheduled 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
20 
Total 
 
 
4 
15 
14 
17 
10 
12 
13 
14 
7 
1 
4 
3 
3 
4 
1 
3 
2 
127 
 
 
3% 
12% 
11% 
13% 
8% 
9% 
10% 
11% 
6% 
1% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
3% 
1% 
2% 
2% 
 
 
3% 
15% 
26% 
39% 
47% 
57%a 
67% 
78% 
84% 
85% 
88% 
90% 
92% 
95% 
96% 
98% 
100% 
 
 
0 
15 
28 
51 
40 
60 
78 
98 
56 
9 
40 
33 
36 
52 
14 
45 
40 
695 
Number of inter-
views cancelled 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
10 
11 
Total  
 
 
42 
16 
14 
13 
6 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
99 
 
 
42% 
16% 
14% 
13% 
6% 
4% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
 
 
 
42% 
59%b 
73% 
86% 
92% 
96% 
97% 
98% 
99% 
100% 
 
 
0 
16 
28 
39 
24 
20 
6 
7 
10 
11 
161 
Source: 2000 Student Survey. 
a The cumulative percentage of 57% does not equal the sum of 47% and 9% as a 
consequence of rounding. 
a The cumulative percentage of 59% does not equal the sum of 42% and 16% as a 
consequence of rounding. 
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 v. Corollary: students limit their application pools. 
  A natural consequence of the speed with which things resolve in the 
market for federal judicial law clerks is that students have an incentive not to 
apply to judges within that market in whom they are interested but not that 
interested. Our student survey in both 1999 and 2000 asked, “Did you limit 
the number of judges to whom you applied based on a concern that some of 
your less-preferred judges would offer you interviews or positions before you 
had heard back from your more-preferred judges?” More than half of the 
respondents (55%) answered “yes” to this question in 2000 (of a total of 128 
responses to this question). In 1999 42% answered “yes” (of a total of 108 
responses to this question).  
 It should be noted that the efficiency aspects of this feature of the 
clerkship market are less clear than the efficiency aspects of the features 
discussed above. Some desirable matches may not be made—as when a 
student does not apply to a given judge who would have hired the student, 
and for whom the student would have liked to clerk, and the student ends up 
with no clerkship at all—but at the same time, limited application pools save 
resources that would have been spent by judges, recommenders, and other 
parties on matches that might never have materialized. 
 
   vi. Another corollary: students opt out of the process  
    entirely. 
  The nature of the law clerk hiring process may also lead some 
students not to apply at all. More than half (58%) of the students who said in 
response to our 2000 survey that they did not apply for federal appellate 
clerkships reported that their decision not to apply was influenced by either 
the nature or the timing of the market. (We discuss the timing of the 
market—the early date at which the market takes place—in more detail 
below.) We did not ask a similar quantitative question of students in 1999, 
but from that year we have anecdotal evidence, summarized in Table A7 in 
the Data Appendix, of a similar effect of the nature of the process on 
students’ decisions to apply. Obviously, if students who choose not to apply 
are missing opportunities that they would (in a better world) want to pursue, 
and judges would be interested in some of these individuals, then the nature 
of the process of law clerk hiring is impeding the satisfaction of judges’ and 
students’ preferences.  
 
  b. Early hiring. 
  The law clerk market may fail to maximize judges’ and clerks’ 
satisfaction not only as a result of the nature of the process (the focus of the 
previous discussion) but also as a result of the early time at which hiring 
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occurs. As noted in Part I above, when hiring occurs early, judges have less 
information on which to base their decis ions about which clerks would be 
most attractive to them. Likewise, students have less information about 
whether and where they would like to clerk. Our survey results show both that 
the clerkship market has moved progressively earlier in time over the last three 
hiring seasons and that the early time at which the market moves—like the 
nature of the process itself—discourages some students from applying at all.  
 
   i. Evidence on timing in the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000  
    clerkship markets. 
  Our survey results show that the clerkship market moved relatively 
early in the second year of law school in 1998-1999 and earlier still in 1999-
2000; these results thus provide a striking illustration of unraveling in 
progress. Table 13 compiles the information reported by judges about the 
timing of the market in these two years. For 1998-1999, 28% of judges had 
begun interviewing and making offers by the end of January 1999, and 63% 
had reviewed applications by that time. These numbers are remarkable in light 
of the policy of the leading law schools during 1998-1999 that applications and 
recommendation letters from law school faculty were not to be sent prior to 
February 1. As the data dramatically show, this policy did not hold up. The 
data also reveal that a substant ial number of judges moved earlier in 1998-
1999 than they had in 1997-1998, as reported in the penultimate row of Table 
13. 
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Table 13: Timing of the Market As Reported by Judges 
 Percent of judges responding  
(cumulative percentages in parenthesis) 
 Date of Review of 
Applications 
Date of Interviews 
and Offers 
 1998-1999 1999-2000 1998-1999 1999-2000 
   start 
datea 
finish 
dateb 
start 
datea 
finish 
dateb 
Sept. or 
earlier 
2% 
(2%) 
14% 
(14%) 
1% 
(1%) 
1% 
(1%) 
0% 
(0%) 
0% 
(0%) 
Oct. 
 
2% 
(4%) 
7% 
(21%) 
0%  
(1%) 
0% 
(1%) 
3% 
(3%) 
1% 
(1%) 
Nov. 2% 
(7%)c 
22% 
(43%) 
1%  
(2%) 
1% 
(2%) 
12% 
(15%) 
8% 
(9%) 
Dec. 21% 
(28%) 
29% 
(72%) 
7%  
(9%) 
1% 
(3%) 
29% 
(44%) 
22% 
(31%) 
Jan. 35% 
(63%) 
11% 
(83%) 
19% 
(28%)  
16% 
(19%) 
27% 
(71%) 
32% 
(63%) 
Feb. 23% 
(86%) 
4% 
(87%) 
43%  
(70%)d 
38% 
(57%) 
10%  
(80%)e 
17% 
(80%) 
March 
or later 
14% 
(100%) 
13% 
(100%) 
30%  
(100%) 
43% 
(100%) 
20% 
(100%) 
20% 
(100%) 
earlier 
than the 
prior 
year 
28% 55% 34% 56% 
later 
than the 
prior 
year 
2% 4% 3% 3% 
Total number of judges responding: 134 for 1998-1999, 112 for 1999-2000 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
a The start date is the date at which the judge started conducting interviews and making 
offers. 
b The finish date is the date at which the judge finished conducting interviews and 
making offers. 
c The cumulative percentage of 7% does not equal the sum of 4% and 2% as a 
consequence of rounding. 
d The cumulative percentage of 70% does not equal the sum of 28% and 43% as a 
consequence of rounding. 
e The cumulative percentage of 80% does not equal the sum of 71% and 10% as a 
consequence of rounding. 
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 Things happened even more quickly, and by a substantial margin, in 
1999-2000. As shown in Table 13, 72% of responding judges indicated that 
they had reviewed applications by the end of December, compared to only 28% 
in 1998-1999. 44% indicated that they had started to interview candidates and 
make offers by the end of December, compared to only 9% in 1998-1999. By 
the end of January, 63% were completely done with interviews and offers, 
compared to only 19% in 1998-1999. Also as shown in Table 13, 55% of 
responding judges said that they reviewed applications earlier in 1999-2000 
than they had in 1998-1999, and 56% said they conducted interviews and made 
offers earlier in 1999-2000, while almost no judges said they did either step 
later. By any measure, then, the clerkship market moved substantially earlier in 
1999-2000 than in 1998-1999. Table A8 in the Data Appendix provides similar 
timing information broken down by Circuit. 
On the student side, 81% of the students who did one or more 
interviews in 1999-2000 reported having at least one interview before the 
end of December of 1999, as shown on Table 14. 57% of the students who 
received one or more offers during 1999-2000 reported having at least one 
offer before the end of December of 1999, as also shown on the table. 
 
 
Table 14: Timing of the Market Reported by Students, 1999-2000 
Sent 
applications 
First contact 
from a judge 
(among 
students who 
received such 
contacts) 
First interview 
(among 
students who 
did 
interviews) 
First offer 
(among 
students who 
received 
offers) 
Date 
(cumulative percentages in parentheses) 
Sept. or 
earlier 
2% (2%) 0% (0%) 0% (0%) 0% (0%) 
Oct. 20% (22%) 3% (3%) 2% (2%) 0% (0%) 
Nov. 67% (89%) 42% (45%) 24% (26%) 14% (14%) 
Dec. 10% (99%) 42% (87%) 55% (81%) 43% (57%) 
Jan. 0% (99%) 10% (97%) 15% (96%) 29% (86%) 
Feb. or 
later 
1% (100%) 3% (100%) 4% (100%) 14% (100%) 
Number 
of 
responses 
128 124 120 102 
Source: 2000 Second-Year Survey. 
 
 For skeptics who tend toward the view that the current market for 
federal judicial law clerks must be operating efficiently, the data presented 
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here raise serious questions. If 1999-2000 was efficient, then was 1998-1999, 
when hiring occurred substantially later, also efficient, or was it inefficient? 
More generally, given how much the timing in this market has bounced 
around over the years, it seems hard to assert that any current resting point is 
efficient.  
The efficiency argument seems particularly strained for the 1999-
2000 market, when the timing of the market clashed with both students’ final 
exams and the law firm recruitment process. Tables A9-1 and A9-2 in the 
Data Appendix summarize student complaints about these clashes. It seems 
hard to believe that the 1999-2000 timing was optimal in any respect. 
 
   ii. Effects of early hiring on decisions to participate in the  
    market. 
 As noted above, students may opt out of the law clerk market because 
of the nature of the hiring process; they may also opt out because of the early 
time at which hiring occurs. As noted above, we know that more than half 
(58%) of the students who said in response to our 2000 survey that they did 
not apply for federal appellate clerkships reported that their decision not to 
apply was influenced by either the nature or the timing of the market. Also as 
noted above, for 1999 we have anecdotal evidence from students who did not 
apply for federal clerkships, and, as shown in Table A7 in the Data 
Appendix, for a number of these students the early time at which hiring 
occurs was a significant  factor. Thus, the early time at which hiring occurs, 
like the nature of the process, may reduce the satisfaction of judges and 
students by dissuading some students from applying at all. 
 
 2.  Disillusionment with the federal bench. 
 Moving from the efficiency criterion to the concern with 
disillusionment with the federal bench, our survey results provide strong 
support for the view that the rough-and-tumble nature of the clerk hiring 
process carries risks to the regard in which the federal judiciary is held. A 
number of respondents to our judge and student surveys emphasized this 
concern, as summarized by the often poignant comments quoted in Table 15. 
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Table 15: Law Clerk Hiring and Regard for the Federal Judiciary 
Survey Comment 
1999 Judge 
Survey #7 
[T]he current non-system makes applicants see judges behaving in 
ways which are unseemly, to put it mildly. That view of our 
behavior will inevitably shape what these people think of the 
judiciary. To the extent that many of these applicants will become 
leaders in the bar and in politics, we will as judges reap what we 
have sown. They will hold us in contempt and will not be wholly 
wrong. 
2000 Judge 
Survey #11 
The unseemly haste to hire law clerks is a disgrace to the federal 
bench. 
2000 Judge 
Survey #5 
The students think our hiring process is foolish. We are presently 
embarrassing ourselves with our lack of self-control. 
2000 Judge 
Survey #101 
The current approach reflects poorly on the judiciary. 
1999 Student 
Survey #111 
I can’t overstate how disillusioned, disgusted and depressed the 
whole clerkship application system has left me. . . . [W]atching 
federal judges panic and lie [and] having interviews canceled after 
traveling to New York makes me clearly realize that this system 
needs reform. 
1999 Student 
Survey #154a 
Some judges scrapped decorum and even bare civility. One federal 
district court judge asked a student to sneak into his office on a 
Sunday in January, through the service entrance. His court had 
agreed not to conduct early interviews, he explained, and he 
wanted to cheat in secret. 
2000 Student 
Survey #6 
Federal judges (many of them) suffer from immaturity, 
unprofessionalism, and egotism that I guess should be expected 
from life-tenured government employees who have no incentive to 
behave like adults. 
2000 Student 
Survey #43 
The gamesmanship that currently pervades the process is 
incredibly frustrating to students and . . . corrosive of the dignity 
of the federal judiciary. 
1999 Student 
Survey #104 
I accepted an interview offer with a judge on the West Coast and 
flew out at considerable expense. At the end of the interview, it 
became evident that the judge had already made enough 
outstanding offers to fill his slots. I believe that he interviewed me 
as a ‘backup.’ 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys and Second-Year Student Surveys. 
a This response took the form of a newspaper editorial that the student had written 
about the market for federal judicial law clerks. 
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 The comments in Table 15 are obviously anecdotal. However, 
quantitative data from our judge surveys make clear that the underlying forms 
of judicial behavior noted in the table are far from isolated. The practice of 
interviewing candidates (at the candidates’ expense) when no slots remain 
available is far less rare than we would have guessed prior to the surveys. We 
would have guessed that this occurred only very occasionally; indeed, one 
judge wrote in response to our inquiry about whether the judge had at least one 
slot left by the time of the last scheduled interview, “Yes, of course. What kind 
of a slug do you take me for?”46 
The numbers, however, show a striking number of self-confessed 
“slugs.” In 2000, almost one in five responding judges (17%) had no slots 
available by the time of their last scheduled interview with a candidate, as 
shown in Table 16. Senior judges were more likely to have no slots left than 
active judges, as the table shows, but still, in both 1999 and 2000, almost one 
in ten active judges admitted to having no slots available by the time of their 
last scheduled interview. Some judges presumably cancel scheduled 
interviews once their slots are filled, but this may or may not spare the 
candidate the expense of a fruitless trip depending on the refundability of the 
candidate’s airplane ticket.   
 
Table 16: Judges Who Had No Slots Left By the Time of Their 
Last Scheduled Interview 
Percent of responding judges with no slots 
left by the time of their last scheduled 
interview 
Group 
1998-1999 1999-2000 
All federal appellate judges 
Active judges 
Senior judges 
Senior status not specified 
11% 
9% 
10% 
100% 
 
Total number of 
responses: 
139 
17% 
9% 
32% 
N/A 
 
Total number of 
responses: 
110 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
 
The lack of open slots by the end of the interview period is a natural 
tendency of a process under which the great majority of judges start making 
offers before completing their interviews. In both 1999 and 2000, 
approximately three-quarters of active judges responding to our surveys had 
                                                                 
46 2000 Judge Survey #90.  
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made at least some offers before the completion of interviews, as shown in 
Table 3 above. We do not mean to suggest that offering some positions 
before the end of interviewing is necessarily objectionable, but it does 
obviously mean that those interviewing later—who may be paying large 
sums to travel to the interview—are competing for fewer and fewer 
positions. 
  Students responding to our surveys expressed not only direct 
concerns about judges’ conduct but also a general disenchantment (voiced in 
no uncertain terms) with the clerk hiring process. Tables 17-1 and 17-2 
provide a sampling of some of the most striking comments. Of course, these 
responses may not represent a random slice of student opinion; presumably 
we were more likely to hear from students dissatisfied with the process than 
from those who were pleased with it. At the same time, it is critical 
emphasize that, as the right-hand column of the tables reveals, the sources of 
the negative student comments appear generally to have been quite 
successful in the clerkship market. This is particular clear for 1999, when we 
asked for detailed information about the judges from whom the student 
received offers. Our measure for 2000—the total number of offers the 
student received—is less informative, but it still seems noteworthy that none 
of the students quoted failed to receive at least one clerkship offer. Thus, this 
is not a group of disgruntled students who received no clerkship offers or (at 
least insofar as 1999 reveals) only offers from relatively unappealing judges.  
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Table 17-1:  Student Reactions to the Law Clerk Market, 1999 
Survey Comment Student’s 
Outcome 
#184 It's terrible. Just about anything, including 
malicious lies, forcible running with scissors, 
and active misuse of electric cords, would be 
better. 
No offer. 
#119 Craziness. 
 
 
Two offers from 
highly prestigious 
Court of Appeals 
judges. 
#172 Insane.  
 
 
Three offers from 
highly prestigious 
Court of Appeals 
judges. 
#178 Chaotic. 
 
 
Three offers from 
top District Court 
judges in 
Washington DC 
and New York 
City. 
#168 Brutal. 
 
Offer from a 
highly prestigious 
Court of Appeals 
judge. 
#123 A total mess. 
 
 
Offers from three 
prestigious Court 
of Appeals and 
District Court 
judges. 
#121 [A] complete mess. Offers from four 
prestigious Second 
Circuit judges. 
Source: 1999 Second-Year Student Survey. 
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Table 17-2:  Student Reactions to the Law Clerk Market, 2000 
Survey Comment Student’s 
Outcome 
#26 You will have to arrest me before I will again 
set foot in [specified courthouse]. I would not 
wish this process on my worst enemy. 
1 offer. 
#9 One of the most arbitrary and ill-designed 
processes I’ve ever come across. 
1 offer. 
#20 A crap shoot. 1 offer. 
#21 Horrible. 2 offers. 
#23 One of the worse experiences at law school. 2 offers. 
#25 Chaos. 2 offers. 
#28 Absolute hell. 1 offer. 
#32 Crazy. 2 offers. 
#40 Disorganized and chaotic. 2 offers. 
#200 A zoo. 2 offers. 
#234 A mess. 1 offer. 
#240 The clerkship hiring process is a disgrace. It is 
everything that we are taught at law school to 
dislike: inefficient, arbitrary and capricious and 
designed to benefit those with connections and 
inside information. 
1 offer. 
#245 Deeply unfair. 1 offer. 
#246 An extremely unpleasant process. 1 offer. 
#247 Terrible. 3 offers. 
#252 Totally outrageous, . . . stressful [and] chaotic. 2 offers. 
#255 Clerkship hiring is like flying through the air 
without a net, you never know where you’ll 
land, and how hurt you’ll be in the process. 
1 offer. 
Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey. 
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 Almost as interesting as some of the quotations in Tables 17-1 and 
17-2 was the following remark from a student who had a more positive view 
of the clerkship hiring process: “I think it benefits law students at privileged 
schools to be subjected to the same random, difficult job search process that 
people in other fields have to [undergo].”47 Perhaps that is the best argument 
to be made for the current process, but it does not suggest that this process is 
one that is likely to cast the federal judiciary in a particularly favorable light. 
 
 3. Perceived fairness. 
 As noted in Part I above, some students may regard the law clerk 
market as unfair to the extent that the frenzied manner and early timing of 
hiring lead the market to rely on various forms of personal well-connectedness 
in matching applicants with judges. Students with relationships to previous 
high achievers in the legal world and elsewhere may be advantaged in the 
clerkship competition as a result of the limited information available to judges. 
Our survey results provide evidence both that personal well-connectedness 
does matter in at least some cases and that some students (and judges) regard 
this as unfair. Note that our claim is not that such reliance is “unfair” (however 
defined) but simply that some participants in this market regard it as such and 
experience disutility as a result. Also, it may be that any process would be 
regarded as unfair by some, but the fairness objections we describe below 
appear to be shared by a larger group than would probably be the case under a 
different system. 
 
   a. Peer recommendations. 
 An intriguing feature of the market for federal judicial law clerks is the 
role played by other students’ and recent graduates’ recommendations. In 
some instances clerks or judges solicit the opinions of applicants’ current 
classmates, as reflected in the survey comments reported in Table A10 in the 
Data Appendix. These comments show both that peer references from current 
classmates matter in this market and that at least some students regard this as 
unfair.  
 At least as important as recommendations from current classmates are 
recommendations from recent law school graduates who are currently 
clerking. Our 1999 and 2000 judge surveys show that two-thirds of responding 
judges (68% in 1999 and 66% in 2000) use current clerks to screen 
applications. Table 18 shows that, at least anecdotally, current clerks may rely 
in part on their personal connections in performing the screening function. 
Interestingly, at least two of the students quoted in the table (the third and 
                                                                 
47 2000 Student Survey #264.  
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eleventh quotations) seemed to regard the effect of the personal connection 
as unfair even though they were presumably helped by it. 
 
Table 18: The Role of Connections with Current Law Clerks 
Survey Comment 
1999 Survey 
#109 
With [a particular judge] one of his clerks I knew from law school. 
The judge made it clear that this clerk was rooting for me. 
1999 Survey 
#160 
I have a good friend clerking for [a particular judge] who thought 
we would be a good fit-I’m sure her influence was helpful. 
1999 Survey 
#163 
I know the current clerks of [two particular judges with whom the 
candidate received interviews]. Both have assured me that I 
received interviews on my merits . . . . That’s what they say, but I 
can’t help but feel like perhaps they had some influence. 
1999 Survey 
#134 
A current clerk [of a judge from whom the student received an 
offer] is an acquaintance of mine and helped get me an interview. 
1999 Survey 
#115 
Current clerks in [two particular judges’ chambers, who were 
graduates of the candidate’s law school, played an important role]. 
I am pretty sure they had good things to say about me to their 
respective judges. 
1999 Survey 
#49 
A [clerk for a particular judge] helped me get an interview. 
1999 Survey 
#55 
[Knowing a current clerk for a particular judge] probably 
expedited my ability to get the interview [with that judge]. 
2000 Survey 
#5 
[T]wo current clerks with whom I had worked either called me for 
an interview with their judge or recommended me to another judge 
in the same circuit. 
2000 Survey 
#12 
I knew the current clerk of a judge who interviewed me, I’m sure 
that clerk played a role in my getting the interview. 
2000 Survey 
#20 
I was acquainted with one of the clerks currently working for [a 
judge from whom this candidate received a clerkship offer]. 
2000 Survey 
#32 
I think there would have been no chance of me interviewing with 
[a particular judge] if a friend of mine hadn’t been one of her 
clerks. That made it all the more satisfying when I [later] got an 
interview with [a different judge] whom I know I have no contact 
with. 
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Table 18: The Role of Connections with Current Law Clerks (continued) 
Survey Comment 
2000 Survey 
#39 
One of the current clerks [of a particular judge] is an old 
acquaintance. 
2000 Survey 
#251 
The two appellate and six SDNY [Southern District of New York] 
interviews were all with judges with whom I had some connection 
through their clerks. 
2000 Survey 
#254 
I know, and was not hurt by, a current clerk. 
2000 Survey 
#10 
One current clerk for [a particular judge] used to be an 
acquaintance at school. I think he helped get me an interview. 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Second-Year Student Surveys. 
 
 b. Faculty “clerkship brokers.” 
 Clearly law professors play an important role in the clerkship process; 
their recommendations of students are a significant component in judges’ 
evaluation of applicants, as shown in Table A11 in the Data Appendix. No one 
seems to regard that in itself as unfair. But sometimes the role of the faculty 
member goes beyond the familiar role of recommender. In some instances 
professors play the role of “interview broker” or “offer broker” in the clerkship 
market or even choose the clerks themselves. This is reflected in the comments 
from our student and judge surveys reported in Table A12 in the Data 
Appendix; it is also reflected more quantitatively in responses to our judge 
surveys, which showed that approximately 27% of judges in 1999 and 19% in 
2000 relied on professors to screen applications. 
 At least some students and judges seem to regard the sort of “faculty 
feeding” described in our student and judge surveys as unfair: 
I am and was completely repulsed by the “this professor 
secretly handpicks and recommends a favorite student to a 
particular judge” routine.48 
[T]he biggest problem . . . for students [is] the old boy’s 
network. If you are not the darling of an aged white male 
professor, who may be severely uncomfortable working with 
talented women or people of color, you should kiss your 
chances of a clerkship goodbye and not bother applying. In 
my [particular school] class, approximately 80% of the 
students who received circuit court clerkships “applied” as [a] 
                                                                 
48 2000 Student Survey #16. 
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formality only, their clerkships were delivered to them by 2 or 
3 faculty members.49 
The “special deals” between judges and professors violate the 
spirit if not the letter of attempts to hire in a more orderly 
way.50  
 
  c. Other forms of well-connectedness. 
 Social connections may also aid some applicants, and again this may 
be regarded as unfair. Table 19 lists student comments suggesting the 
importance of various forms of social well-connectedness, including 
connections with friends of a judge or a judge’s former clerks. Some 
participants in the market are likely to view the role of such connections as 
unfair; as one student lamented, “I feel that I was not a party to the network.”51 
 
                                                                 
49 2000 Student Survey #251. 
50 1999 Judge Survey #26.  
51 2000 Student Survey #24.  
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Table 19: The Role of Various Types of Social Connections  
Survey Comment 
1999 Survey 
#177 
A good family friend called [a particular judge], and I received a 
call from the judge about thirty minutes thereafter. [The student 
ultimately received an offer from this judge.] 
1999 Survey 
#120 
[A] close friend of [a particular judge] made a call on my behalf. 
1999 Survey 
#129 
A former [clerk for a particular judge] called [that judge] to 
recommend me. I think I was [that judge’s] top . . . choice based on 
that clerk’s recommendation. 
1999 Survey 
#130 
A former clerk of [a particular judge] is a good friend of mine, and 
played a big role. 
1999 Survey 
#189 
With [a particular judge] a family connection helped. 
2000 Survey 
#7 
A former clerk who knew me well called her judge for me. 
 
2000 Survey 
#11 
Got an interview (and the offer) in [specified court] because old 
college friend was ex clerk and talked me up to judge. 
2000 Survey 
#12 
One of my best friend’s father is a law professor and he put in a call 
for me to a judge he knows. 
2000 Survey 
#59 
A friend of my mother’s put in a good word with a judge they 
knew. 
2000 Survey 
#234 
The clerkship I eventually accepted was offered after a professor at 
another law school (who I know well) made a phone call to the 
judge. 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Second-Year Student Surveys. 
 
 In short, the law clerk market appears to rely heavily on various 
forms of personal well-connectedness, and at least some participants seem to 
regard this as unfair. 
 
III. The Experience of Other Markets 
 The law clerk market is far from alone in its difficulty in establishing 
the timing of transactions, with the variety of efficiency and other problems 
that result. Table 20 below lists several dozen markets and submarkets that 
have experienced the unraveling of transaction dates. Table  20 concentrates 
primarily on markets that, like the law clerk market, are entry-level 
professional labor markets. Timing problems are particularly easy to identify 
in these markets because generally employment cannot begin until the 
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professional has completed his or her education, yet arrangements may be 
made far in advance. However, timing problems are not restricted to labor 
markets: the list in Table 20 includes the market for postseason college 
football bowls. Again timing problems are easy to identify here, since 
postseason bowl games cannot be played until the end of the regular season. 
Another good example of timing problems in a nonlabor context is fraternity 
and sorority rush, where recruitment had at one point moved back into the 
preparatory schools from which particular colleges drew their students, despite 
the fact that involvement in the fraternity or sorority did not commence until 
college.52 Yet another example is early admission to college; nearly three-
quarters of high school students who go on to attend elite colleges now apply 
for early admission to one or more colleges in response to incentives offered 
by colleges.53 
                                                                 
52 See Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 1019. Indeed, here the unraveling of 
selection dates has even entered the language in the form of the term “rush.” 
See Susan Mongell & Alvin E. Roth, Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching 
Mechanism, 81 AMER. ECON. REV. 441, 441 (1991). 
53 See Christopher Avery & Richard Zeckhauser, The Early Admissions 
Game: The Perspective of Participants (work in progress). 
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Table 20: A Selection of Markets with Timing Problems 
Market Organization Stagea 
Entry-level medical labor 
markets: 
  American first-year  
  postgraduate (PGY1) 
  positions 
  Canadian first-year  
  positions 
  U.K. regional markets   
  for preregistration  
  positions: 
     Edinburgh 
     Cardiff 
     Birmingham 
     Newcastle  
     Sheffield 
     Cambridge 
     London Hospital 
  American specialty    
  residencies: 
     Neurosurgery 
     Ophthalmology 
     Otolaryngology 
     Neurology 
     Urology 
     Other specialtiesb 
  Advanced specialty   
  positions: 
     12 (primarily sur- 
     gical) specialtiesc 
     Medical 
     Subspecialties 
     Four ophthalmology   
     Subspecialties 
     Plastic surgery 
 
 
National Resident Matching Program 
  (NRMP) 
 
Canadian Intern and Resident  
  Matching Service 
Regional health authorities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neurological Surgery Matching Program 
Ophthalmology Matching Program 
Otolaryngology Matching Program 
Neurology Matching Program 
AUA Residency Matching Program 
NRMP 
 
 
Specialties Matching Services 
 
Medical Specialties Matching Program 
 
Ophthalmology Fellowship Match 
 
Plastic Surgery Matching Program 
 
 
3 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
3 
3 
4, 1 
4, 1 
3 or 4, 1 
3 
3 
 
 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 and 4 
 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
a The “stages” are explained in the text just below. 
b Anesthesiology, emergency medicine, orthopedics, physical medicine, psychiatry, 
and diagnostic radiology. 
c Colon/rectal surgery, dermatology, emergency medicine, foot/ankle surgery, hand 
surgery, ophthalmic plastic and reconstructive surgery, pediatric emergency medicine, 
pediatric orthopedics, pediatric surgery, reproductive endocrinology, sports medicine, 
and vascular surgery.  
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Table 20: A Selection of Markets with Timing Problems (continued) 
Market Organization Stage 
Entry-level legal labor 
markets: 
  Federal court clerkships 
  American law firms 
  Canadian articling  
  positions 
     Toronto 
     Vancouver 
     Alberta (Calgary) 
 
 
Judicial Conferences 
National Association for Law Placement  
Articling Student Matching Program 
 
 
 
 
 
2, then 1 
1 
 
 
3 and 4 
3 or 4, then 1 
3 
Entry-level business 
school markets 
  New MBA's 
  New marketing  
  professors  
 
 
 
 
 
1d 
1 
Other entry-level labor 
markets: 
  Japanese university    
  graduates 
  Clinical psychology  
  internships 
  Dental residencies  
(three specialties and 
other general 
programs) 
  Optometry residencies 
 
 
Ministry of Labor; Nikkeiren 
 
Association of Psychology Internship 
Centers 
Postdoctoral Dental Matching Program 
 
 
 
Optometric Residency Matching Services 
 
 
2 
 
2, then 3 
 
3 
 
 
 
1 and 3 
Postseason college 
football bowls 
National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) 
1, then 3 
Other two-sided matching: 
  Fraternity rush 
  Sorority rush 
 
 
National Panhellenic Conference 
 
 
1 
3 
Source: Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing, Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and 
Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 992 
(1994). 
d Occasionally. 
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 In many of the markets in Table 20, considerable effort has been 
expended to halt, reverse, or otherwise control the timing of transactions. The 
table lists for many of the markets the organization that has been entrusted 
with this task. Many of these organizations were created expressly for the 
purpose of controlling the unraveling of transaction times. In many instances 
these organizations can bring to bear considerable compulsory power. But 
frequently a solution to the timing problem has nonetheless proved elusive. 
The difficulties encountered by these other markets may therefore illuminate 
the problems in the market for federal judicial law clerks and the prospects and 
potential pitfalls in the road to reform of this market. 
 
A. A Framework: Four stages of unraveling markets.   
 To make it easy to describe the common phenomena found in a diverse 
set of markets, Table 20 loosely categorizes each market it describes as most 
recently being in one of four “stages,” as follows.54  
 Markets that are in the process of unraveling—in which appointment 
dates are getting earlier from year to year, or in which they have moved to 
the earliest feasible date—are stage 1 markets. Here is a generic description 
of stage 1: 
Stage 1 begins when . . . the relatively few transactions [in the 
market] are made without overt timing problems. By the 
middle of stage 1 . . . some appointments are being made rather 
early, with some participants finding that they don't have as 
wide a range of choices as they would like–students have to 
decide whether to accept early job offers or take a chance and 
wait for better jobs, and some employers find that not all of the 
students they are interested in are available by the time they get 
around to making offers. The trade journals start to be full of 
exhortations urging employers to wait until the traditional time 
to make offers, or at least not to make them any earlier next 
year than this year. Towards the end of stage 1, the rate of 
unraveling accelerates, until sometimes quite suddenly offers 
are being made so early that there are serious difficulties 
distinguishing among the candidates. There is no uniform time 
for offers to be made nor is there a customary duration for them 
to be left open, so participants find themselves facing 
unnaturally thin markets, and on both sides of the market a 
variety of strategic behaviors emerge, many of which are 
regarded as unethical practices. Various organizations 
concerned with the market may have proposed guidelines 
                                                                 
54 This section draws from Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 996-98. 
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intended to regulate it, without notable success. As stage 1 
ends, influential market participants are engaged in a vigorous 
debate about what can and should be done.55 
Although this was not written as a description of the law clerk market, it fits it 
to a “T”. 
 Stage 2 markets are those that have instituted regulations specifying the 
time before which offers and sometimes other contacts cannot be made, and 
sometimes how long offers must remain open. Stage 2 markets are still 
decentralized, with employers contacting potential employees directly to make 
offers. During each of the six attempted reforms of the law clerk market, this 
market was in stage 2. For instance, the most recent attempted reform specified 
February 1 as the date before which contacts could not be made and March 1 
as the date before which (in effect) offers could not be made.56 
 Stage 3 markets are those that have instituted centralized market 
clearing procedures, which not only serve to determine the time at which 
transactions take place, but also organize the transactions (the order in which 
offers are made and the point at which transactions are finalized). The most 
common form of stage 3 organization has potential employers and employees 
contacting each other (via applications, interviews, etc.) in a decentralized 
way, after which each employer submits a rank ordering of applicants to a 
central clearinghouse, to which each applicant also submits a rank ordering of 
positions. The clearinghouse then uses these preference lists, in some pre-
specified way (now often formalized in a computer program), to produce a 
match, and employers and employees are simultaneously informed of the 
results of the match. Perhaps the largest and best known of the centralized 
markets is the one by which new medical school graduates are matched to 
first-year residencies. But, as Table 20 makes clear, lawyers too participate in 
stage 3 markets; “articling” positions required before being called to the bar in 
Canada are arranged in this way in several major cities. 
 Stage 4 markets are those with centralized mechanisms, but in which 
there has been at least some unraveling prior to the centralized market, as 
participants jockey for advantage in the centralized procedure.  
[T]he unraveling has often taken the form of recruiting students 
for summer internships (or in the case of some medical 
specialties for ‘audition electives’), which amount to extensive 
interviewing opportunities in which the students spends a 
                                                                 
55 Id. at 996. 
56 Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 209-15, describe the six 
attempted reforms. As discussed in Part IV.B below, the March 1 date 
specified by the most recent reform technically applied to interviews, but most, 
although not all, judges are reluctant to hire without an interview. 
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period of weeks or even months at the firm. Because of the 
length of time involved, students can interview in this way at 
only a very small number of firms, and firms can interview 
only a few students in this way. Because the percentage of new 
employees hired by each firm who were previously summer 
interns there sometimes becomes quite high, these internships 
can become a way of moving the recruiting process before the 
centralized matching mechanism.57 
  These four stages provide a framework within which to discuss the 
particular markets from Table 20 in more detail. In the next section we offer 
some vignettes from those other markets.  
 
B. Vignettes. 
 1. Medical residencies. 
 A good place to begin is with the history of the market for new 
American medical school graduates, both because that is the first of these 
“unraveling” markets to have been studied as such by economists58 and 
because of its role (discussed more fully in Part IV.C below) in various 
proposals to reform the clerkship market.59 But it is not the successful 
experience of the centralized, stage 3 medical market that we wish to discuss 
here but instead the period from 1945 to 1951, when the medical market was 
organized as a stage 2 market.60 
 Prior to 1945 there had been a severe unraveling of appointment dates, 
so that medical students were being selected for post-graduation employment 
when they still had two full years remaining of medical school (much like 
today’s market for federal judicial law clerks). In 1945 the medical schools, 
working in conjunction with the residency programs, successfully 
implemented an embargo on letters of reference until a specified date, and this 
                                                                 
57 Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 997. 
58 See Alvin E. Roth, The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns 
and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J. POL. ECON. 991 (1984). 
59 See Annette E. Clark, On Comparing Apples and Oranges:  The Judicial 
Clerk Selection Process and the Medical Matching Model, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711 
(1995); Kozinski, supra note 1; Trenton H. Norris, The Judicial Clerkship 
Selection Process: An Applicant’s Perspective on Bad Apples, Sour Grapes, 
and Fruitful Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 765 (1993); Oberdorfer & Levy, supra 
note 32; Wald, supra note 2. Several of these authors have cited the economic 
investigation into the medical market in support of their (opposing) positions 
on reform of the clerkship market. See Kozinski, supra note 1, at 1721 n.29; 
Oberdorfer & Levy, supra note 32, at 1101 n.15, 1103 n.27. 
60 The following description is taken from Roth, supra note 58, at 992-95. 
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proved effective. The date of appointment was successfully moved to one year 
before employment would begin, and in subsequent years the dates at which 
letters were released, and appointments made, were moved into the last year of 
medical school, nearer to the time of appointment.  
 But the problems experienced by this market did not end when the 
appointment date was controlled (a stage-2-type solution). There followed a 
period in which the market was extremely disorderly, with students being 
called upon to make increasingly prompt decisions whether to accept offers. In 
1945 offers were supposed to remain open for 10 days. Each subsequent year 
that interval was shortened, until by 1949 a grace period of 12 hours had been 
rejected as too long, and exploding offers were explicitly allowed. What had 
happened was that hospitals found that if an offer was rejected very near the 
deadline, it was often too late for them to reach their next most preferred 
candidates before they had accepted other offers. Even when there was a long 
deadline, much of this action was compressed into the last moments, since a 
student who had been offered a position at, say, his or her third choice hospital 
would be inclined to wait as long as possible before accepting, in the hope of 
eventually being offered a preferable position. So, regardless of how long 
offers were to remain open, the period just before the deadline was frenzied, 
with students seeking to improve on the positions they had been offered by 
contacting the hospitals they preferred, and with hospitals sometimes 
pressuring students into early decisions in order not to have to contact students 
on their waiting lists after the deadline had expired. This of course gave the 
hospitals that applied such pressure an advantage over those that did not, with 
a longer deadline possibly compounding the advantage. 
 A central clearinghouse was proposed and adopted only when these 
attempts to organize a stage 2 market had been exhausted. With modifications, 
this kind of central clearinghouse has been used now in the medical residency 
market for almost half a century. The design of the current medical 
clearinghouse was directed by one of the authors of this work,61 and its details 
are discussed more fully in Part IV.C below. 
 
 2. Post-season college bowls. 
 The American medical market is large and impersonal, and one 
important feature of this market, both before and after the move to a 
centralized clearinghouse, is that informal understandings between participants 
are not always honored. But in smaller markets, in which participants can 
expect to encounter each other again at later points in time, promises can often 
be relied on. Paradoxically (since one would ordinarily think that a small 
market would make an agreement on a fixed starting date for transactions 
                                                                 
61 See Roth & Peranson, supra note 9. 
  
 
 
 
59 
easier to sustain), the small size can further increase the difficulty of achieving 
a stage 2 solution. 
 The experience of post-season college football bowls is illustrative.62 
For many years the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
attempted to control the date at which bowl agreements were signed by 
specifying a date (commonly called “Pick-Em Day”) before which such 
agreements were forbidden. The idea was to delay selection until sufficiently 
late in the regular season that there would be a good chance that teams with the 
best records at the end of the season would be matched against one another. 
However, despite the considerable penalties the NCAA can levy on teams and 
bowls, the fact that informal agreements could be relied upon allowed teams 
and bowls to make early agreements and avoid penalties. 
 During the 1991-1991 football season there were highly publicized 
informal agreements, four weeks before the end of the regular season (and two 
weeks before Pick-Em Day), which sent Notre Dame to the Orange Bowl, 
Miami to the Cotton Bowl, and Virginia to the Sugar Bowl. At that time (with 
four games left to play) Notre Dame, Miami, and Virginia were ranked by the 
sportswriters' poll as the number 1, 3, and 8 teams in the nation. But, following 
some losses before the bowl games were actually played, Notre Dame had 
dropped from number 1 to number 5, and Miami had dropped out of the top 20 
altogether. “Because of the substantial penalties for breaking NCAA rules, 
there are no public accounts of the details of these informal agreements. 
However, in confidential discussions with participants in this market, great 
confidence was expressed in the reliability of such agreements once made.”63 
 The NCAA gave up trying to enforce a date for bowl agreements 
following the embarrassing experience in the 1990-1991 season. Since then 
bowl selection has become more centrally organized (a stage 3 model), based 
on agreements between consortia of football conferences and independent 
teams and consortia of bowls. Thus, as in the case of the medical market, the 
attempt at a stage 2 solution proved infeasible, and a more centralized 
mechanism was adopted. 
 
 3. Clinical psychology positions. 
 One of the longest-running stage 2 markets was the American market 
for pre- and post-doctoral internships for clinical psychologists, which 
                                                                 
62 Our discussion here draws on Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 1007-13. 
63 Id. at 1012 n.22. The authors go on to note: “This is not to say that these 
agreements are never broken, and we heard of at least one occasion in which a 
university broke an unofficial agreement with a major bowl and was ostracized 
by the bowl (and perhaps by some other bowls, although this is less clear) for 
several years thereafter.” Id. 
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operated as a stage 2 market from the 1970s through the 1997-1998 academic 
year.64 In this market, transactions were all to be made by telephone on 
“Selection Day” (akin to Pick-Em Day), a specified day in a specified month 
of each year. The rules required that no offers be made before the “opening 
time” of the market (9:00 AM Central Standard Time in the early 1990s), and 
that all offers made during the course of the market and not yet rejected remain 
open until the “closing time” (4:00 PM Central Standard Time in the early 
1990s). That is, both early offers and exploding offers (which require a 
decision before the end of the market) were not allowed. Programs that still 
had some positions vacant after the market closed could then make exploding 
offers to fill them.  
 This market survived for roughly 25 years despite a certain level of 
noncompliance, with somewhere between 10% and 25% of students reporting 
forbidden contacts from employers before the start of Selection Day. 65 A 
variety of rules were formulated to discourage employers from soliciting 
promises from applicants that if offered a job they would accept it, but these 
too were difficult to enforce. Both the early contacts and the solicitation of 
promises seemed to be related to the fact that employers had good reason to try 
to avoid making offers that might be rejected late in the day on Selection Day. 
The reason is that, at 4:00 PM, students who had offers in hand would accept 
them before they expired, so that a firm that had an offer rejected just before 
then might find that many of its more preferred alternate candidates had 
already accepted positions before they could be contacted. Observations of this 
market and interviews with participants suggest that, in deciding to whom to 
make offers, employers were substantially influenced by which students had 
indicated in advance that they would accept, and that, knowing this, students 
very often made such an indication to some employer. Early contacts and 
promises had much less force in the market for medical residencies prior to the 
move to a stage 3 solution, despite the similar congestion problems that 
existed, because (among other things) the size of the market means that a 
student who breaks an informal promise in the medical market may well never 
to have to deal again with the residency director who elicited it. In the clinical 
psychology market, by contrast, promises are reliable, since, as one program 
director said to one of us (Roth), “You see these people again.”66   
 As a result of these problems, the clinical psychology market converted 
recently to a centralized clearinghouse, modeled on the medical market but 
adapted to the special features of the clinical psychology market. This 
centralized market ran for the first time in academic year 1998-1999 for 
                                                                 
64 This section draws on id. at 1016-18 and Roth & Xing, supra note 18, at 
285-86, 288-91. 
65 See Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 1017.  
66 Roth & Xing, supra note 18, at 289 n.6. 
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positions beginning in June 1999. So, once again, the market moved from 
stage 2 (which proved unsuccessful) to stage 3.  
 
 4. Japanese university graduates. 
 Yet another example of a stage 2 market is the market for graduates 
of elite Japanese universities.67 The unraveling in this market is so persistent 
and widespread that it has a popular name, aota-gai, which translates as 
“harvesting rice while it is still green.” Although hiring before specified 
dates is formally prohibited, hiring well in advance of graduation 
nevertheless persists through informal but effective guarantees of 
employment known as naitei. These informal arrangements are similar to the 
understandings that brought down the stage 2 approaches in the college 
football and clinical psychology markets. 
 After a company has offered naitei to a particular candidate, the 
informal agreement is enforced through an interesting mechanism. 
Companies that offer naitei to students long before the beginning of 
employment try to prevent them, via physical restraint, from interviewing 
with other companies or government ministries. For example, a company 
might invite all of the students to whom it had offered naitei to come on a 
company outing on the day the Finance Ministry was offering its civil service 
exam, with the understanding that the guarantee of employment would be 
withdrawn from any student who missed the outing. 
 Naitei, then, is a very effective means of making arrangements prior to 
the official date allowed in this stage 2 market. Despite the effectiveness of 
naitei, this market has continued to be organized (officially) as a stage 2 
market, although in its practical effects it is probably more akin to a stage 1 
market as a result of the role of naitei. 
 
 5. Canadian articling positions. 
Canadian law graduates take an “articling” position following 
graduation and before being called to the bar. The various regional markets 
for articling slots have been subject to unraveling, just as has the American 
market for federal judicial law clerks.68 In response to this problem, two of 
the articling markets, in Toronto, Ontario and in Alberta (primarily in 
Calgary), are now organized as stage 3 markets employing an algorithm 
developed in part by one of the present authors (Roth) initially for the 
medical match. 69 As described above, stage 3 markets are ones in which 
                                                                 
67 Our discussion here draws on Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 1014-16. 
68 See id. at 1024. 
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matching of applicants to positions occurs through a centralized 
clearinghouse. Participation in the articling clearinghouses is by a subset of 
the firms in each regional market; some firms in each market do not 
participate.  
A centralized matching system solves one of the fundamental 
problems with a stage 2 solution, which is that congestion may occur on the 
start date. (Recall that this was the reason for the move to a stage 3 solution 
in the market for medical residency positions.) But the problem of implied or 
informal agreements in circumvention of the centralized clearinghouse 
remains. “Offers” and “acceptances” may be communicated outside the 
match with one side telling the other, “I’ll rank you first in the match if you 
rank me first.” This effectively moves the match date earlier, even if there is 
100% pro forma participation in the centralized process. Applicants and firms 
will simply submit forms requesting to be matched with the parties with whom 
they had already agreed months in advance. This is by no means an academic 
problem; in some failed matches, up to 80% of the matching forms submitted 
to the centralized mechanism list only one partner, making clear that 
everything has been settled in advance.70 
The stage 3 market for articling positions in Canada has taken a 
number of interesting steps to address the problem of informal agreements. In 
the Toronto match there are detailed regulations governing the nature of 
permissible communications between candidates and firms. (The Law Society 
of Upper Canada regulates the Toronto articling market. It is more difficult to 
get information about the operation of the Alberta market because it works 
without the direct oversight of a regulatory body.) The Law Society 
regulations seek to control the communication between firms and students 
both before and after interviews occur. Recognizing that, in light of the 
incomplete coverage of the centralized match and the fact that offers from 
nonparticipating firms may need to be acted upon before the match date, it is 
impossible to eliminate completely the discussion of rank orderings among 
participants—but wishing to prevent students being pressured into “deals” 
that would subvert the intention of the match—the regulations attempt to 
define and limit what kinds of communication are allowed when firms and 
students discuss the upcoming match. The regulations provide that firms may 
provide ranking information to students in advance of the match, but only 
within a specified time period. 
A.8. Subject to the exception noted below regarding summer  
students, no communication of ranking intentions shall take 
place prior to 8:00 a.m. on Monday, August 14, 2000.  
Exception: Firms in the matching program may communicate 
ranking intentions to summer students employed with their 
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firm in the summer months of 2000 prior to Monday, August 
14, 2000.71 
The regulations further specify that students may, but cannot be 
required or pressured to, provide ranking information to firms: 
A.9. Firms shall not request from a student, explicitly or 
implicitly, information on intentions as to where the student 
will rank the firm.  
Commentary: Voluntary communication of ranking intentions 
by firms made in accordance with procedure A.8 will be 
permitted, provided the manner of communication does not 
impose pressure on students to reciprocate with 
communication of their own ranking intentions. For example, 
it is improper for a firm to say to a student “we will rank you 
within the firm’s complement of students in the match (or 
first, etc.) if you rank us, or tell us, or commit to us, that you 
will rank us first . . . .” 
A.11. Firms communicating ranking intentions to students    . 
. . are strongly encouraged to communicate their ranking 
intentions using the terminology set out in the Society's 
“Guidelines for Firms Participating in the Matching Program 
re: Communication of Ranking Intentions to Articling 
Candidates.”72 
A major source of the pressure to communicate outside the match in 
the Canadian articling market has to do with students who have applied both 
to firms in the match and firms not in the match. Since many more students 
participate in the match than there are positions offered in the match, the 
intention of permitting firms to communicate ranking information is to help 
students to decide whether or not to accept an offer they may have received 
from a nonparticipating firm.  
The centralized clearinghouses in the Canadian articling market seem 
to be working, although the regulations also show that this market requires 
some careful maintenance. The central remaining problem with the Canadian 
articling match is the heavy reliance on summer positions to “audition” 
articling candidates. In this respect the market has sharp tendencies toward a 
stage 4 outcome. There is significant interaction between the market for 
articling positions and the market for summer associateships for students 
                                                                 
71  “Procedures Governing the Recruitment of Articling Students for the 
2001-2002 Articling Year,” Law Society of Upper Canada, 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca./services/services_articlingproc2001_en.shtml (visited 
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72  Id. 
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who have completed their second year of law school. This is not a recent 
development but rather one with which the articling market has dealt for a 
long time. As a partner at the Toronto law firm of Blake, Cassels & Graydon 
observed roughly a decade ago:  
Students now feel virtually compelled to obtain a summer job 
in Toronto after their second year in law school and as a 
result, a substantial portion of the articling hiring process has 
now been placed on the shoulders of the summer program. 
Students are being hired for summer positions halfway 
through their second year in law school….Everyone 
recognizes that this is a back-door method of obtaining an 
articling position. 73 
The market for medical residencies is marked by the same stage 4 tendencies 
in a number of subspecialties, as described just below. 
 6. Medical residencies (again). 
 As described above, the medical market adopted a centralized 
clearinghouse after the failure to organize a successful stage 2 market in the 
middle of this century. But as in the Canadian articling market, in certain 
subspecialties the selection process may in fact begin well before the 
centralized match. In highly competitive areas such as orthopedic surgery and 
neurosurgery, preference for residency positions is often given to candidates 
who have done “audition electives” with the program in question. 74 These 
“auditions” last six weeks and give the program and student a chance to 
become acquainted with one another well in advance of the centralized match. 
Since students can audition with only a few programs, and programs can offer 
auditions to only a few students, the auditions represent a form of 
“prematching,” where some selection occurs on both sides well before the 
centralized match.  
 Note that sometimes (in other markets, including the American market 
for new law school graduates) summer or “elective” positions do not reflect 
efforts to circumvent stage 3 mechanisms. These positions may exist even in 
markets without a stage 3 (or stage 2) regime because they provide employers 
with useful information about candidates, or candidates with useful 
information about employers, prior to entry into a more permanent 
commitment. An obvious example here is summer associate positions at 
American law firms; these positions do not represent an attempt to “prematch” 
in advance of a centralized procedure or specified offer date (since neither 
exists in this market, although once an offer—which may be made at any 
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time—is made, the National Association for Law Placement regulates the 
amount of time for which it must be kept open75). Rather the summer 
associateship seems to be a way for law firms to gather information about 
candidates and provide information to them about the firm. Interestingly, 
though, the dates of appointment for summer associateships at American law 
firms themselves have unraveled over the years;76 thus, instead of the summer 
associateship being a way around a mechanism adopted to control unraveling, 
the market for summer associateships is itself subject to unraveling. 
 
IV.  Three Decreasingly Modest Proposals for Governing the Market for 
Federal Judicial Law Clerks-and How Their Chances of Success Can Be 
Made Less Bleak 
 What can be done about the law clerk market? The possibilities for 
reform (or not) are familiar from past experience and the existing literature: 1) 
Let the market go without attempting to regulate it (so that it will remain at 
stage 1); 2) Establish a start date for offers and perhaps also interviews (the 
stage 2 solution, tried several times in the past); and 3) Institute a centralized 
clearinghouse (the stage 3 approach). As noted above, because there is a range 
of existing opinion on reform, we consider each of the three possibilities just 
described rather than focusing on a single one. We attempt to describe how 
each could best be implemented and what its odds of success are in light of 
what we know from our empirical evidence and the experience of other 
markets. Ultimately we conclude that a centralized matching system for 
federal appellate clerkships that may lead into Supreme Court clerkships holds 
the most hope for reforming the presently unraveling market. 
  
A. The “do nothing” approach: A decentralized market in which  
 participants are free to act as they wish. 
 Despite what seems to be a reasonably broad consensus among judges, 
clerks, and observers that the market for federal judicial law clerks is not 
working particularly well, a number of judges responding to our surveys 
expressed strong support, often in colorful terms, for the “do nothing” 
approach. Their comments are summarized in Table 21. These statements 
were not made in response to a specific question about the desirability of 
regulation; they were offered in response to an open-ended question asking 
judges whether there was anything else they would like to share with us 
about their views of the law clerk market. 
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Table 21: Judges’ Criticism of Efforts to Reform the  
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks 
Survey Comment 
1999 Survey 
#54 
I think that it is a waste of time to try to devise ‘systems’ for this 
‘process’. I get excellent clerks in the free market and I see no need 
for regulation (but then I never do). 
1999 Survey 
#51 
Cartels do not work. People cheat. Judges cheat. Law schools cheat. 
Attempts at regulation are an attempt by established eastern law 
schools, especially Harvard whose professors are conducting this 
survey, to improve their lock on the market.  
1999 Survey 
#60 
Is this an attempt to resurrect the ‘East Coast Law School Cabal?’ 
1999 Survey 
#12 
Forget it! Leave it up to the judges and the applicant when to 
interview, apply or hire. 
1999 Survey 
#14 
The free market should govern the process. Government 
intervention is not justified. If judges want to make offers on the 
basis of insufficient data they should be free to do so. If students 
want to accept clerkship offers after one day of law school thereby 
passing up better opportunities later the market should allow them 
to do so. 
1999 Survey 
#37 
I would leave it alone and just let judges and law clerks do what 
they want to. Laissez faire. 
1999 Survey 
#72 
I will refuse to be bound by any combination agreement or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade. All cures are worse than the 
“disease”. . . . Leave it alone and get out of our hair. . . . Free trade 
is the best. I do not believe the system is either chaotic or bad. Get 
off it. 
1999 Survey 
#84f 
I have no problems and would be happy if nobody tries to impose 
rigid rules on me or anyone else. 
2000 Survey 
#38 
[T]he less regulation[] the better.  I have never had any problem 
handling the process of hiring law clerks. . . . [T]he system is fine as 
it is. 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
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 What is likely to happen if, in accord with these sentiments, the 
market is left unregulated? 
 Prognosis. Grim. Hiring will continue to occur in a frenzied manner 
and is likely to move back even further in the student’s law school career, so 
that even less information is available. As already noted, in 1999-2000 
interviewing commenced in the early fall of the second year of law school, and 
there is no reason in principle why it could not move back until late in the 
summer after the first year (when, indeed, travel for interviews might be 
particularly easy); no new information emerges between the late part of the 
summer (after spring grades, law review selection, and references from 
professors for whom students may have worked as summer research assistants 
become available) and the early to middle fall. It is even possible that hiring 
would move back to the beginning of the second semester of first year, by 
which time first-semester grades would be available (except at Yale, where all 
first-semester classes are pass-fail; Yale students would thus be at a significant 
disadvantage). The good news is that clerkship hiring probably cannot move 
any earlier than the first semester of law school.  
 Palliatives. While we are waiting to see how early is early, judges 
could be encouraged to enter their hiring schedules in a generally available 
database. Indeed, an approach along these lines was instituted last year by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.77 
 An information database would, if there were a reasonable degree of 
participation, and if participating judges provided accurate dates in a timely 
manner, ameliorate some of the existing confusion about judges’ timing, and 
this would certainly be a valuable service. However, neither of the two 
conditions just noted is likely to hold. The judges who move early to gain a 
strategic advantage over other judges are unlikely to participate in a database 
for precisely the reasons that drive them to jump the gun in the first place. If it 
is widely known that they are moving at a given time, other judges are likely to 
move up their schedules in response, and this will reduce the competitive gain 
from going early. Consistent with this suggestion, relatively few Court of 
Appeals judges list hiring times in the new Administrative Office database. 
 A further reason for limited participation is that once some judges are 
not participating, other judges will be reluctant to commit to particular dates 
for hiring clerks because developments in the market may cause them to want 
to move earlier; alternatively they may specify particular dates in the database 
but then feel compelled to move earlier as a result of changes in the market. 
Indeed, even without a centralized database this sort of problem comes up. 
Before the creation of the Administrative Office database, chambers frequently 
told law school placement offices that they would begin the hiring process on a 
certain date but then departed from this date as changes occurred elsewhere in 
                                                                 
77 See https://lawclerks.ao.uscourts.gov (visited 1/29/01). 
  
 
 
 
68 
the market. For all of these reasons, a centralized database is unlikely to 
address the fundamental problems in the market for federal judicial law clerks. 
 
B. If at first you don’t succeed, try again: Set start dates. 
 If remaining in stage 1 seems unappealing, what about a stage 2 
solution? The key feature of a stage 2 approach would be that some authority 
would set a start date for offers, and perhaps also a start date for interviews, a 
length of time for which offers must be left open, or both in an effort to govern 
the market for federal judicial law clerks. Obviously various incarnations of 
this approach have been tried, and have failed, on several past occasions in this 
market.78 Also, as the vignettes above show, such approaches have been tried, 
and have failed, in the markets for medical residencies, college football bowls, 
clinical psychology positions, and Japanese university graduates. Indeed, many 
of the markets listed in Table 20 have at some points in their history attempted 
to organize themselves as stage 2 markets but have failed and either have 
slipped back into stage 1 or have adopted a more centralized (stage 3) 
organization.  
 The point is in fact very general: We are aware of no market that has 
successfully organized itself as a stage 2 market for an extended period 
without problems of the sort observed in the markets discussed above. The 
clinical psychology market is the closest case, but even there, as noted above, 
there were serious problems of congestion and informal agreements prior to 
the specified Selection Day, and this market moved to a stage 3 organization in 
1998-1999. 
 Do the same factors that explain the failures of stage 2 approaches in 
the other markets explain the past failures in the law clerk market? Might a 
new and improved stage 2 approach work in the latter setting?  
 Prognosis. Grim. There are several problems, illuminated by the 
experiences of the markets described in Part III.  
 (I) Congestion. The first difficulty is that even if the start date were 
fully adhered to by all parties (an unlikely outcome, as we discuss below), 
there would be severe congestion in the market on the start date, and this 
would preclude participants from considering a range of possible transactions 
before making their decisions. Our earlier discussion of the medical residency 
market in the late 1940s is illustrative; the reason that the stage 2 solution 
failed was not that the start date was not adhered to, but that there was severe 
congestion in the market on the start date. 
 Within the category of start-date regimes, there are two main 
approaches. Under the first, there is an offer start date and then either an earlier 
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start date or no start date for interviews. This was the situation in the clinical 
psychology market prior to the institution of the centralized match. As 
described above, substantial congestion occurred on Selection Day in this 
market. Past reform efforts in the law clerk market likewise demonstrate the 
problem. Judge Wald’s account of the 1989-1990 clerk market, when the 
Judicial Councils in many circuits had adopted a deadline of May 1 at noon 
(Eastern Standard Time) for offers, with a consensus on a one-hour minimum 
response time and no limits on interviews prior to May 1, is representative in 
its essential features: 
[T]he major complaint was the frenzy with which offers had to 
be made and accepted. Those judges who gave their choices 
time to reflect found themselves severely disadvantaged. The 
one-hour window collapsed as applicants fe lt constrained to 
accept the first offer tendered. A judge who did not get through 
to an applicant at 12:00 noon was often too late. ‘I got my first 
choice,’ one judge complained, ‘and, after that, having given 
the applicant a half hour, I found my next 8 or 9 choices gone.’ 
By 12:15 virtually all of the bidding in the D.C. Circuit was 
over. Between 12:00 and 12:15, judges were making offers on 
one line as calls came in on a second from frantic applicants 
trying to learn if they were to get an offer before they 
responded to the offer of another judge.79   
Congestion problems of this sort are likely to be severe in markets with offer 
start dates and earlier, or no, start dates for interviews. 
 The second possible approach is to have the offer start date also be the 
interview start date. This was effectively the situation under the most recent 
attempted reform of the law clerk market, under which interviews were not 
supposed to occur (under a “nonbinding” Judicial Conference guideline) prior 
to March 1.80 Under this guideline there was no official regulation of offer 
times, but one presumes that most judges would not hire applicants for “the 
most intense and mutually dependent [relationship] I know outside of 
marriage, parenthood, or a love affair”81 without an interview, although a few 
judges do take this route,82 and indeed judges, like other employers, may well 
systematically overestimate the importance of interview performance relative 
to other qualities.83  
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 The difficulty with a common start date for interviews and offers is that 
neither judges nor students will be able to conduct or participate in many 
interviews. The experience with the March 1 regime was that “both interviews 
and offers bunched around the March 1 date, so students had little latitude in 
scheduling interviews”84 and little opportunity to interview with a range of 
judges (and conversely for the judges). 
 (II) Cheating. Alongside congestion, the second and equally 
fundamental problem with a stage 2 solution is that it is virtually impossible to 
prevent defections from the specified start date. This has happened before in 
the law clerk market, and it is the overwhelming consensus of judges that it 
would happen again. Both our 1999 survey and our 2000 survey posed the 
following question to judges: “If the Judicial Conference established, by rule, 
a firm start-date for interviews of September 1 of the third year of law 
school, do you believe that all or virtually all court of appeals judges would 
adhere to this date (in spirit as well as in letter)?” 72% of responding judges 
in 1999, and 74% in 2000, stated that they did not believe all or virtually all 
of their colleagues would adhere. Our survey showed that most judges say 
they are willing to comply if others are (93% in 1999, and 92% in 2000, said 
they would comply if “all or virtually all” other Court of Appeals judges 
were complying), but the problem is that they do not believe that most others 
will comply.   
 The problem is the familiar one of trying to sustain a self-enforcing 
cartel—one in which there is no outside sanction for defection. In general a 
cartel is much easier to sustain if strong outside sanctions exist to punish 
defectors. In the case of ordinary cartels, antitrust law denies enforcement of 
any explicit agreements, thereby eliminating most of the effective outside 
means of sanctioning those who defect. Likewise in the context of a start date 
for the law clerk market, the ability of some central authority to mete out 
punishments to judges who defect is limited by the institutional cons traints 
surrounding the judiciary. Particularly because cheating may be far from 
explicit (as discussed below), it is difficult to imagine draconian punishments 
being handed out to Article III judges. The lack of explicitness, as well as 
other factors, likewise make it difficult to imagine handing out strong 
punishments to clerkship applicants who were interviewed or hired before the 
specified date.  
 So only a self-enforcing arrangement among judges is realistically 
possible. But of course the difficulty of sustaining such an arrangement is well 
known. The problem is particularly acute in the clerkship context, since parties 
cannot compensate those who are disadvantaged by the arrangement for their 
losses. In an ordinary cartel, conflicts of interest among members, if they exist, 
can be smoothed over by compensation; for instance, a seller who would 
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prefer a higher price than the other members of the cartel can be given a larger 
sales quota. But there is no obvious way for a judge who is disserved by a 
given start date to be compensated for the losses he or she would incur from 
compliance with that date.  
 It is clear that some judges lose from specified start dates. Obviously, 
those judges who wish to gain a strategic advantage over other judges by 
jumping the gun are disadvantaged. This is related to our observation in Part 
I.B that the unregulated market is unlikely to be Pareto inefficient: at least a 
few judges are likely to be made worse off if the bargaining gain they enjoy 
from jumping the gun in an unregulated market is eliminated. 
 But other judges would want to defect as well; this is a consequence of 
the congestion caused by a start-date arrangement (hence the defection 
problem is linked to the congestion problem discussed above). Our 
description of the clinical psychology market in Part III.B.3 precisely 
illustrates the problem. The congestion on the start date produces pressure on 
parties to try to arrange deals in advance in order to avoid the problems that 
come up on the official start date. The problem may be particularly acute 
when, as in the 1989-1990 law clerk market, there ends up being no 
minimum time that offers must be kept open. (As Judge Wald describes in 
the passage quoted above, the one hour minimum period collapsed, at least in 
some Circuits, as events got underway on the specified start date.) Here the 
market is likely to be over very quickly (as revealed by the description from 
Judge Wald quoted just above, where much of the bidding in the D.C. Circuit 
was over in 15 minutes), and thus a judge has reason to think that any 
candidate not reached very quickly will probably be committed to someone 
else. Then the judge has reason to be reluctant to make an offer to a 
candidate who is likely to want to hold it for a long time (and as the earlier 
quotation makes clear, a long time can be measured in minutes). Thus, in 
deciding to whom to make an offer, the judge has some reason to favor 
candidates who have indicated a willingness to accept offers quickly. So, in 
turn, candidates have an incentive to let judges know that they will accept 
their offers, since this makes it more likely that an offer will be received. 
Indeed, in the 1989-1990 law clerk market, “[s]avvy clerk applicants . . . 
played their own hands. They (or sometimes their sponsoring professors) 
called chambers in advance to announce that that particular judge was the first 
choice.”85 
 Yet another reason that defection is hard to control with a stage 2 
approach in the law clerk market is that defection will often be difficult to 
detect (and hence will be relatively easy to get away with). Often it is not 
public knowledge when a clerk is hired. Recall our earlier anecdote (in Table 
15) about a judge asking an interviewee to sneak in the service entrance on a 
                                                                 
85 Wald, supra note 2, at 158. 
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Saturday. Without some way of verifying when hires were made or contacts 
occurred, it is difficult to police defections from a start-date arrangement 
(even if enforcement were feasible once defection had been detected). 
 The problem with start dates is not only that they will be undercut by 
defectors—although this is a problem. The problem is that these defectors 
make the judiciary look bad, a concern that many judges have voiced and that 
was discussed above. A system, such as this one, that depends on honorable 
behavior also tends to penalize the honorable and put honor in bad repute. As 
one judge said on our survey with regard to “cartel” solutions: “All you do is 
create an incentive to cheat—on the part of students and judges alike.”86 
 This sort of concern was precisely what motiva ted the Judicial 
Conference’s September 1998 abandonment of the March 1 benchmark start 
date for interviews. Judges who did not honor the start date were thought by 
the Judicial Conference to be engaging in a public act of lawlessness (even 
though there was no official “law” to be broken).87 For similar reasons the 
NCAA and the Japanese Ministry of Labor gave up trying to regulate their 
respective markets; they felt that their decision making bodies were cast in a 
poor light by having made rules that many were not following. 88 
 Palliatives. Could some degree of compliance be achieved if each year, 
at the close of the market, all clerk candidates were surveyed, and a summary 
of the year’s events were circulated, indicating when first contacts were 
reported, whether and when there were agreements in violation of any start 
dates, and so forth? The great difficulty here would be that the report would of 
course have to preserve student anonymity, and probably also omit judge 
names (no student is going to report that Judge X, for whom the student will be 
clerking, winked and nodded well in advance of the start date), and without 
student or judge names it seems doubtful that the report would be very useful. 
 Another possible palliative would involve limiting the information 
available to judges prior to the start date. Making it more difficult for judges to 
gather information will impede their ability to move early, and so (for 
example) the strategy of asking law schools to embargo letters of 
recommendation until February 1, a strategy adopted by the Judicial 
Conference in 1993 in connection with its establishment of a March 1 start 
date,89 was a sensible way to try to reinforce the (failed) attempt to establish a 
later appointment date. The fact that just such a strategy was partially 
successful in the American medical market in the 1940s (as described in Part 
                                                                 
86 1999 Judge Survey #84d. 
87 Although there is no official record of this sentiment, one of us (Posner) 
attended the meeting in question and can testify to the content of the 
discussion.  
88 Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 1012 & n.24, 1016. 
89 See Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 214. 
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III.B.1 above) gave grounds for at least cautious optimism, especially since in 
the medical market this strategy was effective at moving the date of 
appointment back very substantially.  
 But the law clerk market, or at least the most competitive segment of 
this market, is substantially smaller than the medical market.90 In light of the 
size of the law clerk market, the success or failure of any reform that depends 
in part on an embargo on letters of recommendation may succeed or fail based 
on how nearly universal compliance is achieved. Even a relatively small set of 
“leaks,” if they systematically concern the most competitive part of the market, 
has the potential to defeat the intent of the embargo. And it is very difficult to 
prevent all leaks. It is particularly difficult to control informal contacts by 
telephone, and these appear to be common in the law clerk market.91 Of course 
when other professors are offering phone recommendations prior to the 
specified date, refusal by a given professor may harm his or her own students. 
So the temptation to talk to a judge who has already started gathering 
information about other candidates may be considerable.  
 In addition, as already noted, even if defections are perfectly 
controlled, the start-date approach does not work well in giving parties a 
chance to consider a wide range of possible transactions; the problem of 
congestion will remain. And there are no palliatives for that problem. As noted 
above, the start-date approach in the market for medical residency positions 
was abandoned even though there did not appear to be significant problems 
with defection; the reason was that the problems with congestion were thought 
to be intolerable. 
 
C. Centralized matching systems. 
 Many of the markets discussed in Part III, as well as numerous others 
listed on Table 20, have progressed from stage 1 to stage 2 to stage 3, with 
the final move coming after the (inevitable in all markets with which we are 
familiar) failure of a stage 2 solution. A stage 3 solution involves a centralized 
matching system, which allows participants’ preferences to be considered in an 
orderly way and permits one to set the timing of the market at a desired point 
(say, the third year of law school for the market for federal judicial law clerks), 
as is currently the case in the market for medical residencies. 
                                                                 
90 Judge Wald notes, “Thus, in any year, out of the 400 clerk applications a 
judge may receive, a few dozen will become the focus of the competition; 
these few will be aggressively courted by judges from coast to coast.” Wald, 
supra note 2, at 154-55. 
91 See Becker, Breyer & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 219 n.36 (quoting a letter 
from a law school dean to the effect that in 1994 professors at other law 
schools communicated with judges by phone before the authorized date). 
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 1. The “monkey see, monkey do” approach: Adopt the medical  
  system as is. 
 One possibility is to adopt the medical system as is. Several 
commentators have urged something like this approach for the law clerk 
market.92 Here is a recent succinct description of the medical match: 
Each year . . . graduating physicians and other applicants 
interview at residency programs throughout the country, and 
then compose and submit Rank Order Lists (ROLs) to the 
NRMP [National Resident Matching Program], each indicating 
an applicant’s preference ordering among the positions for 
which she has interviewed. Similarly, the residency programs 
submit ROLs of the applicants they have interviewed, along 
with the number of positions they wish to fill. The NRMP 
processes these ROLs and capacities to produce a matching of 
applicants to residency programs.93 
 A few points bear emphasis here. First, the matching occurs after 
personal interviews have been conducted. Neither residency programs nor 
candidates are expected to make choices sight unseen for what are 
relationships in which personality certainly may matter.  
 Second, the medical match reflects purely the preferences of the 
participants for pairing with one another. It does not reflect some broader 
aspect of social planning or engineering by a central authority. The match is 
simply a way of facilitating the parties’ expression and achievement of their 
preferences, an opportunity that is lacking in an unregulated market with 
timing problems. 
 Third, the process is completely confidential. Neither side ever learns 
how the other side ranked it. This seems critical in the clerkship context, as no 
student would want the judge for whom he or she will be clerking to know that 
the student ranked that judge far down on the list. 
 Fourth, the matching system is set up to accommodate the 
preferences of married couples who wish to be in the same geographic 
region. 94 It is also set up to accommodate other specialized preferences of 
applicants and residency programs.95 
                                                                 
92 See Norris, supra note 59; Oberdorfer & Levy, supra note 32; Wald, 
supra note 2. 
93 Roth & Peranson, supra note 9, at 749. 
94 See id. at 758-59. 
95 See id. 
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 Fifth, under the matching system participants can never gain from 
submitting rankings that depart from their true preferences. In other words, 
there is no possibility of gaining from ranking parties on the other side in a 
strategic manner based on impressions of how those parties will be ranking the 
initial party.96 
 Might the medical match approach work in the law clerk market? 
 Prognosis. Not promising. The medical match does away with one of 
the central problems identified above for a stage 2 solution—the fact that 
congestion may occur on the start date. But the problem of implied agreements 
between participants as a way of getting around the strictures of the imposed 
agreement remains. Since judges and candidates are permitted to meet for 
interviews before the match date, “offers” and “acceptances” can be 
communicated well in advance of the centralized match. Just as in the situation 
of the market for Canadian articling positions (see Part III.B.5 above), there is 
nothing here to stop a judge from saying to a candidate: “I’ll rank you first in 
the match if you rank me first.” Or consider a judge who is more subtle, saying 
to a candidate: 
You are my first choice. If I knew that I was your first choice, 
I would just decide now to rank you first in the match. Of 
course, if I am not your first choice, I need to consider other 
candidates, and we won’t have any mutual commitment. But 
if you tell me that I am your first choice, then I will know that 
you will rank me first on your form, and I’ll relax now and not 
worry about other candidates. 
The subtext is:  
Of course, I’m not asking you to make a commitment of the 
kind that we’re not supposed to make. That would be 
unethical on my part. I just want to understand your 
preferences—that is part of what I try to accomplish at an 
interview. Of course, only an unethical cad would mislead me 
about his or her preferences, so I know that I can rely on what 
you tell me. 
No system will work unless it makes this kind of conversation untenable.  
 How is this sort of problem avoided in the medical match? Certainly it 
is not entirely avoided; estimates suggest that 10% to 15% of students are 
urged to make informal commitments to residency programs prior to the match 
date.97 However, there has not been enough “winking” and “nodding” to bring 
                                                                 
96 See id. at 770-71. 
97 See Clark, supra note 59, at 1783 (reporting 1990 survey results 
according to which 10.4% of students nationwide were pressured to make 
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down the system or even weaken it in any significant way. The critical 
difference from the law clerk market seems to be that informal promises are 
far more likely to be binding when made to federal judges than when made to 
residency programs. Studies of the medical match suggest that students feel 
residency programs often lie to them, 98 and this may make students more 
willing to violate a supposed informal understanding (since they feel residency 
programs do this all the time). A key feature in the law clerk market may be 
the relatively small number of judges in the relevant sector of the market. This 
is an interesting feature of the law clerk context, since ordinarily smaller 
markets make coordination easier. Here the small size of the market seems to 
make informal agreements easier to enforce, and it is these informal but 
binding agreements that present potential problems. Thus, just as the ability to 
make informal agreements caused problems with the stage 2 solutions in the 
markets for college bowls, clinical psychology positions, and Japanese 
university graduates, this ability makes wholesale adoption of the medical 
model in the law clerk setting—as several prior commentators have 
advocated—highly problematic. 
 Palliatives. Adopt a modified medical match.  (See below.) 
 
 2. A modified medical match. 
  a. Solving the problem of informal agreements. 
 Since informal agreements intended to circumvent a centralized 
match seem so likely to be problematic in the law clerk market, a successful 
centralized process would have to have a way of preventing them. One step 
the Canadian articling market discussed above takes in response to this 
problem is to require students to affirm on the form on which they submit 
their ranking lists that they “have not accepted an articling position or made a 
commitment to article in the [upcoming] articling year.”99 We propose a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
informal commitments prior to the centralized match); Richard D. Pearson & 
Allison H. Innes, Ensuring Compliance with NRMP Policy, 74 ACAD. MED. 
747, 747 (1999) (reporting that 15% of 1996 and 1997 graduates of the 
University of Virginia School of Medicine were asked for signals concerning 
what rank order list they intended to submit to the centralized match). 
98 For instance, a recent study found that 33% of student surveyed felt that 
residency programs had lied to them during the process, and 58% were 
skeptical of the sincerity of programs’ statements that they would be ranked 
highly by the programs. See Kimberly D. Anderson, Donald M. Jacobs & 
Amy V. Blue, Is Match Ethics an Oxymoron? 177 AMER. J. SURGERY 237, 
238, 239 (1999). 
99 See Law Society of Upper Canada, Articling Handbook for Principals 
and Students. 
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similar approach for the law clerk market: each judge and each student who 
participates in the centralized match should be required to certify, as a 
condition of participation, that no prior understanding or agreement with a 
student or a judge had been reached. The idea is to make destabilizing early 
agreements nonbinding.  
 One way in which this certification requirement would make such 
agreements nonbinding is that parties on the receiving end of impermissible 
overtures seeking informal understandings would presumably feel less bound 
to adhere to such understandings, given their explicitly forbidden status as 
reflected in the certification requirement. A second, and critical, reason the 
certification requirement might work is that if participants are explicitly 
required to certify that no informal understanding was reached prior to the 
match, then a judge who attempted to engineer such an understanding would 
not be in a strong position to retaliate against any student (at least in an overt 
manner) who ended up not ranking the judge highly. That is, it is hard to 
imagine a judge complaining to colleagues, law professors, Supreme Court 
Justices, or anyone else who might be in a position to influence a particular 
applicant’s future that the applicant did not stick to an informal 
understanding that the judge and candidate were explicitly required to certify 
they did not make. And since students have far less power to retaliate against 
judges, there seems little reason to worry about the problem from that end.100 
 
  b. The scope of the centralized process. 
 A critical question in the context of a matching process for the market 
for federal judicial law clerks is the scope of the match. The medical model is 
that all (or virtually all) employers are included. But this model would not 
make sense in the law clerk market, at least as a starting point. The 
comprehensive model very quickly runs up against the fact that a not-
insubstantial number of judges would probably be highly resistant to the idea 
of a centralized match. In a 1989 survey of judges, only one-third expressed 
support for a centralized match101—although a very important caveat here is 
that in the decade since 1989 the market has experienced many more debacles 
                                                                 
100 Of course, each of the reasons just given also suggests that a similar sort 
of certification might be he lpful in the context of a stage 2 solution, where an 
offer start date is specified. But, as noted above, defections are only one of 
the problems with a stage 2 solution. The other major problem, which in fact 
is greatly exacerbated when defections do not occur, is congestion on the 
start date. This congestion, like the problem of informal agreements, prevents 
parties from considering a range of options before making their decisions 
and, in the medical context, led to the adoption of a stage 3 mechanism 
apparently without any problem with defections. 
101 See Breyer, Becker & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 229. 
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and several additional failures of attempts to impose stage 2 solutions, 
meaning that the openness to a stage 3 approach might be greater. 
 A match of comprehensive scope also overlooks what seems to us to 
be a very important feature of the law clerk market. This feature, which 
emerges strongly from our judge surveys, is that there are two groups of 
judges: those who are engendering the problems in the market, and the rest of 
the judges, who perceive no problem obtaining qualified clerks and are not 
eager to be part of any “solution” to what they do not consider to be their 
problem. The first group of judges seems to think it is difficult to obtain the 
clerks the judges desire, while the second does not view this as a problem. 
Judges Wald and Kozinski are in the former camp,102 and the judge author of 
the present article (Posner) agrees with that point of view. Our judge surveys 
provide many examples of judges in the other camp, as reflected in the 
comments in Table 22. 
                                                                 
102 See Kozinski, supra note 1, at 1708; Wald, supra note 2, at 153-55. 
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Table 22: Judges’ Perceptions of a Bifurcated Market  
Survey Comment 
1999 Survey 
#101c 
I have never understood the serious competition between judges 
for clerks. For nearly a quarter of a century, I had fine clerks, 
turning down dozens of applicants who would have been equally 
fine. Of course, I was employing clerks–not judges! 
1999 Survey 
#9 
There are far more well qualified applicants than there are 
positions available in the federal system. 
1999 Survey 
#83 
There are far more good candidates than clerkships. The notion 
that we judges have to compete with one another is misplaced. It’s 
a buyer's market. 
1999 Survey 
#2 
Although I do not interview, as a rule, until the winter or spring of 
the year in which the law clerks start work, I have never had any 
problems obtaining satisfactory law clerks. 
1999 Survey 
#4 
There are plenty of able people out there. 
1999 Survey 
#8a 
[T]here are plenty of good candidates 
1999 Survey 
#8b 
I do not participate in the unseemly "rush" of second-year law 
students (they have only one full year of grades when they apply) 
for judicial clerkships. I interview in May and June of the year 
preceding the Court year for which they are hired and find many 
qualified candidates. 
1999 Survey 
#10 
There are always excellent candidates available even late in the 
year.   
1999 Survey 
#27 
Even though hiring after only 3 semesters of law school is quite 
early, my expertise of almost 10 years indicates that regardless of 
the national strictures, I have a plethora of excellent applicants to 
choose from after the super-stars have been cherry-picked -- I am 
just not bothered by the "sooners", largely because I'm not that 
interested in [unreadable]-hunting for #1 grad and top 5 schools. 
1999 Survey 
#30a 
I do not find the system flawed. Hiring competent clerks has not 
been a problem . . . . 
1999 Survey 
#34 
There are far more qualified applicants than available positions. 
1999 Survey 
#57 
There are plenty of good law grads to go around. 
1999 Survey 
#68 
There are a lot of smart people out there. 
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Table 22: Judges’ Perceptions of a Bifurcated Market (continued) 
Survey Comment 
1999 Survey 
#89 
In the past two years I have  not hired until spring of the year they 
begin clerking. While the field is much smaller, I am content that I 
have harvested clerks roughly equivalent to those hired from the 
primary competitive field. I have not had to lower my demanding 
standards. 
1999 Survey 
#95 
There are plenty of well-qualified law school candidates out 
there…. This "competition" business is nonsense. The judges so 
obsessed with getting the very best must be awfully insecure about 
their own abilities and intellect!! 
2000 Survey 
#99 
[C]ompetition or not, I have always been able to secure fine clerks. 
2000 Survey 
#25 
I have found many qualified candidates after the somewhat 
hysterical selection process undertaken by many appellate judges 
in the early spring. 
2000 Survey 
#47 
There are many more well-qualified candidates than clerkships 
2000 Survey 
#102 
There are plenty of outstanding applicants.  I have always been 
“behind the curve” in hiring but have always been able to secure 
wonderful people to fill these positions! 
2000 Survey 
#91 
I am disgusted by the "rat race" to hire prestigious law clerks.  I 
refuse to take part in it, and by doing so I have discovered many 
highly qualified people–passed over by others–who have been 
excellent law clerks. 
2000 Survey 
#69 
There are lots of great fish in the sea.  Without trying very hard, I 
have gotten consistently excellent clerks, from many different law 
schools.   
2000 Survey 
#63 
It's a pain, mainly because there are a small number of grotesquely 
aggressive judges out there who seem to think that if they don’t get 
x or y to clerk for them they'll somehow suffer [irreparable] injury!  
They need to chill out! 
2000 Survey 
#72 
This is a “big, fancy law school” problem. If my colleagues 
weren't such snobs about where their clerks come from, we'd be a 
lot better off. 
1999 Survey 
#82 
The judges who advertised themselves to the law schools as 
running farm clubs for the Supreme Court seem to be energizing 
most of the competitive problems.  
2000 Survey 
#83 
This is a big school, fat-headed judge problem.  Go away and 
leave us alone.  I'm serious. 
Sources: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
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 There are two possible explanations for the perceived limits on the 
pool of top candidates in the view of the first group of judges. One 
possibility is that the number of judges who perceive the need to hire “top” 
candidates is large relative to the pool of such candidates. But perhaps a 
more important explanation relates to the issue of Supreme Court clerkships. 
Many judges want to attract applicants who will go on to clerk at the 
Supreme Court, not only because of the intrinsic value of these clerks due to 
their high ability, but also because such applicants have instrumental value to 
the hiring judge in that they make the judge more attractive to future 
candidates.103 The role of Supreme Court clerkships can explain why there is 
always a shortage of “best” clerks, since there is a fixed number of Supreme 
Court clerkships. It can also explain why many judges (those not competing 
to be Supreme Court feeders) seem to think that clerk quality is not a big 
issue at all.  
 Picking up on the role of the Supreme Court, our proposed model for 
a centralized match is that participation be required for the limited set of 
federal appellate clerkships that may feed into Supreme Court clerkships, 
with enforcement by the Supreme Court in a manner discussed more fully 
below.104 Thus, a judge who chooses not to participate in the centralized 
match cannot feed any of his or her clerks to the Supreme Court. The judge 
would decide whether to participate, and thus whether to be eligible to feed 
clerks to the Court. A student would regain eligibility for a Supreme Court 
clerkship by clerking for a judge who hired through the centralized match 
following a clerkship with a judge who did not hire through this procedure. 
 Our proposed approach has several advantages relative to a 
centralized match of comprehensive scope. First, it would not require 
participation from, and cause inconvenience to, the judges who do not 
perceive themselves to be the cause of any problem and do not feel the need 
for any solution. This is a significant plus of the proposal. One of the clearest 
lessons from the experience in various medical markets is that the degree of 
participation of employers covered by the centralized process is critical to the 
success of the process.105 A high degree of participation seems much more 
likely with the targeted approach than with a general approach embracing all 
                                                                 
103 See Wald, supra note 2, at 154. 
104 One judge suggested what seems to be a similar two-tier system but as a 
means of enforcing a start date for offers, not a centralized match. The judge 
wrote, “[I]f all the Supreme Court Justices, or even a majority of them, 
announced that none of the group making the announcement would hire any 
law clerk who had been hired the year before in contravention of the rule set 
by the Judicial Conference, this would go a long way towards obtaining 
enforcement of the rule.” 1999 Judge Survey #8c. Our reasons for rejecting a 
start-date approach are discussed in Part IV.B above.  
105 See Clark, supra note 59, at 1761-65. 
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federal appellate judges. On the other hand, it must be recognized that there 
may be some cost to requiring judges who want to hire outside the 
centralized match to self- identify as nonfeeders. But our hunch (although at 
this point it cannot be more than that) is that only a minority of federal 
appellate judges would opt out of the centralized matching process and that 
these judges—the sources of the comments quoted in Table 22—do not have 
significant interest in being regarded as Supreme Court feeders anyway. 
 A second advantage of our targeted approach is that the great 
majority of judges who currently engender the “competitive problems” 
would almost certainly not want to opt out of the Supreme Court feeding 
pool. Thus, the precise judges whose participation is most needed would be 
most likely to participate in the match. 
 Enforcement of our proposed approach would be in the hands of the 
Supreme Court. Would the Court go along? Our survey of the Justices 
showed essentially unanimous agreement on two points: first, the current 
state of the market for federal judicial law clerks is a mess, and something 
should be done about it; and second, there are far more well-qualified 
applicants for Supreme Court clerkships than slots available at the Court. 
Thus, Supreme Court Justices are concerned about the status quo, and they 
would be unlikely to find it a significant burden to limit themselves to clerks 
hired through the match for initial clerkships, particularly given the judges 
who are likely to participate in the match (as discussed just above). 
Fundamentally, given the number of excellent applicants, there is little risk 
that a Justice would gain much from defecting and hiring a stellar person 
who did not participate in the match, since it would be easy for the Justice to 
hire a very good person who did participate in the match. This is not to say 
that the Justices would not perceive the regime to be a restriction on their 
freedom; they surely would. It is simply to say that the restriction would be 
limited in comparison to the significant potential benefit that they 
themselves—many of them former appellate judges—seem interested in 
achieving for the lower federal court system.  
 The most obvious difficulty with our proposed noncomprehensive 
model is that some appellate judges who do not participate in the match may 
try to hire fairly strong candidates before the match; these candidates might be 
led to accept such offers if they are uncertain (as of course they often would 
be) about their chances of getting a clerkship with one of the “Supreme Court 
feeder” appellate judges participating in the match. This would in fact be much 
like the problem that comes up in the present market; students accept offers 
from less preferred judges because they do not know whether offers from more 
preferred judges will materialize (see Table 10 above). This is precisely the 
problem a centralized match is designed to solve. So if hiring did occur before 
the centralized match, a more comprehensive approach might be desirable. But 
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the tailored approach, which recognizes the two-tier market that many judges 
feel currently exists, seems to us a good place to start. 
 A final question concerns clerkships that are not at the federal appellate 
level but might conceivably feed into Supreme Court clerkships. Realistically, 
this is not a concern. Although we do not have comprehensive data, in 1996-
1997, when one of the present authors (Jolls) clerked at the Court, all of the 
law clerks hailed from federal appellate clerkships. 
 
  c. Attributes of a centralized process. 
 A number of arguments have been advanced in the existing legal 
literature in support of a centralized matching process for the market for 
federal judicial law clerks, and a number of objections to these arguments have 
been offered.106 Although the existing debate has focused on a comprehensive 
match rather than on the sort of match we propose here, many of the 
arguments and objections are similar. Since they have been well rehearsed, we 
discuss them fairly briefly. 
 
   i. Ability to consider a range of options. 
 Most fundamentally, a centralized clearinghouse vastly expands the 
parties’ ability to consider a wide range of options before making their 
decisions. This is the main advantage of a centralized matching system. 
 Some have objected to the idea of a matching system on the ground 
that judges might have to conduct more interviews under such a system. 107 
This might well be true, particularly in the early years until judges learned 
how many interviews they needed to conduct in order to be sure they would 
fill their slots. At the same time, in light of the number of interview 
cancellations under the present system (see Part II.C.3.a above), it might well 
be that too few interviews are being conducted at present. Moreover, with 
improvements in technology it may be that interviews can be conducted via 
videoconference. Already the Second Circuit is hearing a fair number of 
cases from upstate New York and Vermont by videoconference. 
 In any event, the cost of having to conduct additional interviews 
seems to be a cost that many judges are willing to bear in exchange for a 
more orderly and sensible process. Our judge survey in both 1999 and 2000 
posed this question:  “In general, would you favor a regime (assumed to be 
                                                                 
106 The literature here includes Clark, supra note 59; Kozinski, supra note 1; 
Norris, supra note 59; Oberdorfer & Levy, supra note 32; and Wald, supra 
note 2. 
107 See Clark, supra note 59, at 1776-70, Kozinski, supra note 1, at 1721 & 
n.31. 
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fully enforceable) under which hiring occurred much later, say in the fall of 
the third year, and in an orderly fashion; under which interviews could be 
scheduled at a judge’s convenience, without the pressure of “beating” other 
judges; but under which more interviews had to be conducted?” 75% of 
judges said “yes” in 1999; 71% said yes in 2000. So many—although not 
all—judges seem willing to bear the burden of more interviews in exchange 
for the benefits that a match might bring. It also seems likely that the judges 
most willing to bear the burden of more interviews are the ones most 
dissatisfied and frustrated with the present system and, thus, most likely to 
opt for participation in the targeted centralized match we propose. 
 
   ii. Reduced geographic bias. 
 A matching process would also significantly reduce the geographic 
bias that may arise under a stage 2 solution to the unraveling problem. 108 
Because the process would no longer be compressed into a very short time 
frame (as under a stage 2 approach and, indeed, also in today’s unregulated 
market), judges not near major cities, where students can visit many judges 
in a short timeframe, would not be as disadvantaged. Also, since interviews 
could occur at any time, candidates might be able to visit judges when they 
are in the area for other reasons. But the latter point should not be overstated: 
judges might well want to interview all of their candidates within a relatively 
compressed time frame, so as to be able to make comparisons, and 
candidates might not want to interview far earlier than other applicants for 
fear that they would be forgotten by the time the judge got around to making 
decisions on rankings for the centralized match. Thus it might be an 
overestimate to suggest, as some advocates of matching systems have, that 
students could interview at any time convenient to them, including while 
flying out to interview for jobs at law firms.109 Still, at a minimum, 
interviews could be scheduled well in advance in a calm and nonchaotic 
manner. 
 Note that the same factors that suggest a reduced geographic bias also 
suggest reduced travel costs, since travel could be arranged well in advance. 
Thus, although more interviews might, all else equal, mean higher travel 
costs for students,110 all else is not equal; instead of buying non-advance-
purchase tickets in order to come on short notice, students could buy 
discounted tickets, which are often only a fraction of the cost of full- fare 
tickets. If discounted tickets are generally one-fifth (say) of the cost of full-
                                                                 
108 See generally Carl Tobias, Stuck Inside The Heartland with Those 
Coastline Clerking Blues Again, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 919. 
109 Norris, supra note 59, at 794, offers such an argument. 
110 As Judge Kozinski argues. See Kozinski, supra note 1, at 1721 n.31. 
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fare tickets (which seems a reasonable estimate), then students could do five 
times as many trips without increasing their travel costs. 
 
   iii. Balance and diversity of clerks. 
 The biggest objection that skeptics about a centralized match have 
voiced is that it interferes with judges’ ability to ensure diversity and balance 
across clerks.111 The idea is that the attractiveness of one clerk will depend 
on who his or her co-clerks will be.  
 This is an important point, but there are three responses to it. First, 
the argument may overstate the degree of control judges have in the current 
market. When a candidate is snatched away by another judge who has made 
an exploding offer, as Part II.C.1.a showed occurs frequently at present, the 
first judge is limited in his or her ability to achieve an optimally diverse and 
balanced mix of clerks.  
 Second, the fact that, as noted above, a number of judges make offers 
to a pool of candidates and fill their positions with the first offerees to accept 
suggests that at least some judges do not regard the composition of their 
clerk team as critical.112 
 Third, and most important, the algorithm used in some matching 
systems provides ways to deal with issues of diversity and balance. For 
instance, the clinical psychology match allows conditions such as “not all 
positions should be filled with candidates from the same school.” Similar 
conditions apply in some of the British medical markets, where Edinburgh 
urological surgeons are able to request what they regard as an appropriate 
gender balance among the students with whom they are matched.113 In 
general, there is no theoretical difficulty in implementing restrictions of this 
sort, in which some candidates are viewed as substitutes for other candidates 
(for instance, candidates from the same school). Thus, it would be easy to 
allow judges to say (for example) “not all positions should be filled with 
candidates of the same sex.”  
 
                                                                 
111 See Breyer, Becker & Calabresi, supra note 8, at 221-22; Kozinski, supra 
note 1, at 1722. 
112 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (describing this strategy). 
113 See Alvin E. Roth, A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-
Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in 
the United Kingdom, 81 AMER. ECON. REV. 415, 428 n.26 (1991). 
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   iv. Impersonal nature of the match. 
 Another criticism that has been offered of a centralized match is that 
it would undermine the “highly personal relationship between judge and 
clerk.”114 Judge Kozinski writes: 
The selection process—for all its expense and pain and 
disappointment and hardship—is the crucible wherein the 
foundation of that relationship [between judge and clerk] is 
forged. The time a judge spends talking to professors and 
reading draft law review notes; the student’s efforts devoted 
to reading the judge’s opinions; the time judge and clerk 
spend in interviews; the weighing of competing 
possibilities—all these help bring the parties psychologically 
to the point where they are ready to make a commitment to 
each other.115 
The difficulty with this argument is that all of these things would continue to 
happen under a matching system (interviews, talking with recommenders, 
clerk preparation for the interview, etc.). The only thing that would be absent 
is what Judge Kozinski describes later as the “electrifying” moment when a 
student says, “Yes, judge, I accept” in person (or on the phone).116 Judge 
Kozinski asks, “How will the bond between judge and clerk be affected 
when offer and acceptance are so impersonal? How will the emotional 
content of the relationship be diminished by the inherently protracted delay 
between interview and computer communication?”117 Whatever the answers 
to these questions (and we doubt that the mode of offer and acceptance has 
much significance in the overall nature of the judge-clerk relationship), we 
would be surprised if, for most participants in the law clerk market, this issue 
outweighed all of the other serious problems and inefficiencies of a stage 1 
or stage 2 market. The survey evidence described in Part II above certainly 
suggests that neither judges nor students generally regard the current process 
as an auspicious beginning to the judge-clerk relationship. 
 
   v. Changes of mind. 
 Another issue raised by critics of a centralized match is that some 
candidates or judges might find their match unacceptable in reality “even 
though it might have seemed acceptable as a remote contingency far down a 
list of happier possibilities.”118 This is a concern, for saying yes to a specific 
                                                                 
114 Kozinski, supra note 1, at 1723. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1723-24. 
118 Id. at 1724. 
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offer out there (or making an offer to a specific candidate) seems different 
from listing a particular judge or candidate on a form that will be processed 
sometime down the road. But this risk must be weighed against the fact that 
candidates change their mind in the current market as well, due we think 
largely to the early time at which decisions must be made. For example, a 
few years ago a Harvard Law School student accepted an offer with a 
prominent D.C. Circuit judge two years ahead of the time at which the 
clerkship was to begin and then, a year or so later, informed the judge that he 
would not be doing the clerkship after all. With the market occurring at a 
later date and in a more orderly fashion, changes of mind on grounds of 
changed circumstances or changed preferences would be far less likely. 
 
   vi. Bargaining power. 
 One of the design questions that must be settled in constructing a 
match is which side of the market “makes offers” and which side “accepts or 
rejects” offers. (Of course these terms do not have their ordinary meanings in 
a centralized matching process, but the concept is similar to who makes and 
receives offers in a decentralized market.) In most matches we know of, this 
issue has been settled by appeal to the practice in the decentralized market; 
thus, in a match for the law clerk market, judges would retain the initiative. 
Interestingly, the recent redesign of the medical match reverses this: the 
match is now conducted so that medical students have the initiative, and 
(within the internal operation of the match algorithm) residency programs are 
treated as if they accept or reject the offers (or applications) of the 
students.119 But it turns out that the two approaches yield largely similar 
results as a practical matter in any event.120 
  d. Transition and administrative issues. 
 The medical match occurs in March of the last year of medical school. 
Ultimately a similar sort of time frame may be desirable for the market for 
federal judicial law clerks. But initially it might be best to have the law clerk 
market occur earlier than the winter or spring of the third year. The reason is 
that it might ease the transition. “Both the models and the experience of the 
many markets that have attempted to halt unraveling suggest that a cautious 
plan of attack” would be to introduce a central match “initially at an early time, 
when a substantial percentage of transactions are already taking place, and 
then to move the time at which the mechanism operates later only after it has 
attracted a high rate of participation.”121  
                                                                 
119 See Roth & Peranson, supra note 9, at 755-79. 
120 See id. at 759-60. 
121 Roth & Xing, supra note 3, at 1038. 
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 Having the process go early would mean that initially only the benefits 
from a more orderly process, and not the benefits from later hiring, would be 
achieved. But even the former benefits seem likely to be significant, 
particularly from the perspective of what seems to be the judges’ primary 
concern, the way in which the process casts the judiciary in a negative light.  
 The modified match we have proposed here could be administered by 
an outside firm skilled in running matches such as the medical residency 
matching program and the clinical psychology matching program. 
Alternatively, the match could be administered by the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts or some other judicially-related entity, presumably 
with some technical help from an outside organization. 
 
  e. Trouble signs in a modified match. 
  i. Movement from a stage 3 to a stage 4 market. 
 A lesson from the other markets discussed in Part III above is that even 
a stage 3 mechanism that is working well can on occasion be threatened by 
unraveling problems. One source of such problems is summer-associate-type 
positions that effectively amount to “prematching” in advance of the 
centralized match. This is stage 4 in the typology described in Part III.A. 
 The possibility of such “prematching” is unlikely, however, to bring 
down a centralized match, assuming it gets up and running successfully. If 
“prematching” were to become very significant—as in the case discussed in 
Part III.B.5 above in which 80% of participants in a match submitted only one 
alternative, making it clear that everything had been settled in advance—then 
the centralized clearinghouse might have to be abandoned, but this has not 
occurred in other markets with centralized matches that produce stable 
outcomes. The situation of 80% prematching occurred in a match that used a 
nonstable matching algorithm. 122  
 
  ii. Informal agreements in contravention of the certification  
   requirement. 
 A separate trouble sign in a modified match in the market for federal 
judicial law clerks would be the reliance of parties on informal prematch 
understandings (unrelated to summer-associate-type positions) 
notwithstanding the certification requirement described in Part IV.C.2.a above. 
A possible response, if such a problem were to develop, would  be the use of a 
small degree to randomization in the match to destabilize the informal 
understandings. The somewhat speculative randomization proposal we offer 
here is meant to suggest one way of dealing with the problem of informal 
                                                                 
122 See id. at 1000. 
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understandings in contravention of the centralized match. We realize that most 
judges are not accustomed to thinking in explicitly statistical terms, so this 
proposal may cause a certain culture shock. 
 Suppose that an anonymous hotline were set up to monitor 
compliance with the prohibition on informal understandings reflected in the 
certification requirement. If this hotline showed that some threshold of 
noncompliance had been reached (say 1% of candidates, or 1% of the total 
number of positions), then it could be announced that 5% (for example) of 
applicants would have their first and second choices randomized in the 
centralized match. That is, for 5% of applicants, there would be a 50% 
chance of having their second choice judge ranked as their first choice and 
vice versa. (If no second choice judge was listed, the student would have a 
50% chance of not being matched at all.) This would give these applicants a 
smaller than 50% chance (with the precise number depending on the 
preferences of both their first and second choice judges) of consequently 
being matched to their second choice judge even if their first choice judge 
wanted them. This would provide all students (not just the 5%) with the 
ability to avoid any understanding that they would put Judge A first when 
they preferred Judge B, since no one would know which students’ choices 
had been randomized; a candidate could simply say to Judge A (who thought 
an understanding with the candidate had been reached) that “randomization 
must have kicked in.” It would be important not to set the threshold number 
of reports required for randomization too high, since receiving the sort of 
informal overture described above from a judge might well produce 
sufficient excitement on the part of a clerkship candidate eager to put the 
process behind him or her that the candidate would not call even an 
anonymous hotline. 
 Hopefully the threat of randomization—and the statement that this 
would make about judges’ behavior—would be enough to deter a sufficiently 
large number of judges from reaching informal understandings that the 
randomization would not ever have to kick in. But the knowledge that in any 
given year randomization could always kick in would help to deter such 
informal understandings in the first place, since there would be some 
question as to how reliable they were. Even in years in which randomization 
would actually occur, it would, we think, probably produce fewer negative 
effects than the current system (although it should be acknowledged that the 
negative effects would be of a different character). Obviously the prospect of 
intentionally failing to put together pairs who want to be with one another is 
troubling and could certainly produce perceptions of unfairness; but so too is, 
and does, the current free-for-all. 
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V.  Conclusion 
 The hiring process for federal judicial law clerks has engendered 
intense dissatisfaction among both judges and students. Hiring occurs earlier 
and earlier—now often early in the student’s second year of law school—and 
in a rushed, chaotic process that resembles a game of musical chairs, in 
which frequently neither judges nor students make their most desired 
matches. Efforts to reform the process have been attempted over the years, 
with a complete lack of success. 
 Our study has differed from the earlier literature on this baffling and 
frustrating issue in three major respects. First, we have placed the issue 
within the context of economic theory that identifies the incentives and 
constraints, and the private and social costs and benefits, that lead to the 
“unraveling” of certain markets. Second, we have situated the clerkship 
hiring market within the range of markets that have exhibited similar 
problems and experienced a wide variety of attempted and achieved 
solutions. And third, we have conducted a far deeper and wider-ranging 
empirical survey of judicial and applicant attitudes and behaviors than any 
previous students of this subject. 
 It would be nice to be able to report that on the basis of this 
unprecedented research effort we have come up with a clear solution to the 
problem. But we have not. The problem is stubborn, intractable; this is plain 
as a matter of theory and as a matter of experience in this and other markets. 
The solutions that have been tried and sometimes succeeded in the other 
markets are unlikely to work as well in the clerkship hiring market because of 
subtle differences. 
 A mature appreciation of the recalcitrance of the world to reformers’ 
efforts requires recognition that many social and economic problems cannot 
be solved and can only be lived with. Nevertheless, not being given to 
fatalism, we have suggested a partial solution, which would require Court of 
Appeals judges who want to be “feeder” judges, that is, who want their clerks 
to go on to clerk for Justices of the United States Supreme Court, to enroll in 
a computerized matching system that would, for those judges and the 
students applying to them for clerkships, very largely eliminate the 
congestion, information, and resulting mismatching problems of the present 
system. More generally, we believe strongly that the Supreme Court could 
play an important and productive role in helping to organize and improve the 
market for federal judicial law clerks. We commend our suggested solution 
to the attention of the relevant decision makers. But we hope that apart from 
its merits and any criticisms that may be lodged against it, our study will be 
seen to have permanent value in framing and illuminating a most interesting, 
if difficult, market problem.  
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Data Appendix—The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks 
 
Table A1: Response Rates by Seniority Status and Circuit,  
1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys  
Number of 
judges 
surveyed 
Number of 
judges 
responding 
Percent of 
surveyed judges 
responding 
Group of federal 
appellate judges 
1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 
All judges 238 238 155 129 65% 54% 
Active judges 161 159 103 84 64% 53% 
Senior judges 77 79 51 45 66% 57% 
Senior status not listed N/A N/A 1 0 N/A N/A 
1st Circuit 11 10 8 7 73% 70% 
2nd Circuit 20 21 9 10 45% 48% 
3rd Circuit 18 19 13 13 72% 68% 
4th Circuit 16 13 10 6 63% 46% 
5th Circuit 20 19 9 10 45% 53% 
6th Circuit 23 22 16 11 70% 50% 
7th Circuit 13 15 10 9 77% 60% 
8th Circuit 17 18 11 15 65% 83% 
9th Circuit 40 43 27 17 68% 40% 
10th Circuit 16 15 11 8 69% 53% 
11th Circuit 18 17 11 8 61% 47% 
D.C. Circuit 11 11 7 6 64% 55% 
Federal Circuit 15 15 11 9 73% 60% 
No circuit listed N/A N/A 2 0 N/A N/A 
Sources: Almanac of the Federal Judiciary (1999) (1999 data on active and senior 
judges); Judicial Yellow Book , Spring 2000 (2000 data on active and senior judges); 
1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys (survey response rates). 
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Table A2: The Importance of Membership in the School’s Main Law  
Review to Judges’ Hiring Decisions  
Ranking of the importance of membership in 
the school’s main law reviewa 
Number of 
judges 
Cumulative 
percentage 
1 6 5 
2 23 25 
3 11 34 
4 14 47 
5 8 53 
6 8 60 
7 7 66 
8 or belowb 7 72 
a factor, but not ranked 7 78 
not a factor 25 100 
Total number of judges responding:  116 
Source: 2000 Judge Survey. 
a Ties in rankings were resolved by assuming that law review membership received the 
higher ranking, so if anything the data reported here overstate  the importance of law 
review membership. 
b Some judges wrote in additional selection criteria, so it was possible for one of our 
eight listed criteria to receive a ranking below 8. 
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Table A3: Representation of Students from Top Law Schools 
in Federal Appellate Clerkships  
Institution U.S. News & 
World Report 
Ranking 
Number of 
Law Clerks 
Size of Class 
Top four: 
Yale 
Stanford 
Harvard 
Chicago 
 
Total 
 
Next six: 
NYU 
Columbia 
Michigan 
Berkeley 
Virginia 
Cornell 
 
Total 
 
Next ten: 
Dukea 
Northwestern 
Penn 
Georgetown 
Texas 
UCLA 
USC 
Vanderbilt 
Minnesota 
Washington and Lee 
 
Total 
 
1 
2 
3 
6 
 
 
 
 
4 
5 
7 
8 
9 
10 
 
 
 
 
10a 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
 
45 
16 
56 
26 
 
143 
 
 
21 
22 
13 
13 
17 
7 
 
93 
 
 
10 
10 
4 
20 
4 
10 
1 
4 
2 
3 
 
68 
 
192 
182 
552 
188 
 
1114 
 
 
443 
389 
356 
282 
363 
182 
 
2015 
 
 
214 
217 
252 
587 
470 
319 
203 
187 
235 
122 
 
2796 
Sources: http://www.usnews.com/edu/beyond/gradrank/law/gdlawt1.htm (visited 
8/17/00) (U.S. News rankings and number of J.D. students (divided by three to get 
class size)); Judicial Yellow Book , Spring 2000 (law clerk data). 
a Tied with Cornell. 
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Table A4: Response Rates of Students By School and By Applicant 
Status, 1999 Second-Year Survey 
Group Number of students 
responding 
Number of respondents 
who applied for federal 
clerkships in 1998-1999 
All seven schools 337 143 
Top four schools: 
Yale 
Stanford 
Harvard 
Chicago 
 
Total 
 
51 
72 
114 
30 
 
267 
 
33 
24 
40 
13 
 
110 
Other schools surveyed:
Columbia 
Michigan 
Vanderbilt 
 
Total 
 
 
26 
13 
31 
 
70 
 
 
13 
5 
15 
 
33 
Source: 1999 Second-Year Student Survey. 
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Table A5: Hiring of Third-Year and Post-Graduate Candidates,  
1999-2000 
Percent of judges whose hiring of third-year 
students for 2001-2002 clerkships was 
Higher than 
Lower than 
About the same as 
their level of hiring of third-year students in 
previous years 
 
 
9% 
14% 
77% 
Percent of judges whose hiring of post-graduates 
for 2001-2002 clerkships was  
Higher than 
Lower than 
About the same as 
their level of hiring of post-graduates in previous 
years 
 
 
10% 
13% 
77% 
Number of third-year students hired for 2001-
2002 clerkships as of the date of the judge 
survey  
 
As a percent of total hires completed at the time 
of the judge surveya 
35   
 
 
 
12% 
Number of post-graduates hired for 2001-2002 
clerkships as of the date of the judge survey 
 
As a percent of total hiring completed at the time 
of the judge surveya 
38 
 
 
13% 
Source: 2000 Judge Survey. 
a 299 total completed hires were reported by judges responding to the survey. 
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Table A6:  Judges’ Reasons for Making Offers Before Completing 
Scheduled Interviews, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 
Survey Judge’s reason for making offers before completing 
scheduled interviews 
1999 Survey #105 Avoid loss to other judge(s). 
1999 Survey #73 Because candidates were already accepting offers elsewhere. 
1999 Survey #18 Because I had to compete with other offering judges. 
1999 Survey #91 Because I really liked her and everything moved so fast this year 
- plus, so many were dropping out before they interviewed with 
me. In any event, she took a position with the judge she 
interviewed with after me - see below. 
1999 Survey 
#106a 
Because I told each interviewee that I would be prepared to 
consider making an offer should they be pressed by another 
judge and required to accept within a specified period of time. 
1999 Survey #36 Because I was pretty certain the candidate would receive an 
offer instanter! 
1999 Survey 
#112b 
Because if I see a candidate I like I give them an offer. 
1999 Survey #90 Because of the issue in the previous question [referring to 
cancellations of interviews by applicants]. 
1999 Survey #8 Because other judges were hiring candidates away. 
1999 Survey #38 Because other judges were making offers to students that I was 
interviewing. 
1999 Survey #42 Competition. 
1999 Survey #33 Did not want to lose outstanding applicants. 
1999 Survey #22 Excellent candidate I didn't want to lose. 
1999 Survey #45 Excellent candidate who had other options. 
1999 Survey #31 Hired one exceptionally qualified candidate on the spot (figured 
she'd be gone if I waited). 
1999 Survey #112 I found a good candidate and didn't want to lose him/her. 
1999 Survey #53b I had to act fast as this candidate was sure to receive other offers 
in the days ahead. 
1999 Survey #17 I learned from experience that if I waited to complete all 
interviews before making offers quite a few applicants would 
withdraw. 
1999 Survey #25 I thought I would lose good prospects if I didn't. 
1999 Survey #8d If I liked a candidate, I made an offer at the interview. The 
reason I did not want to wait until all interviews wee over was 
to minimize the risk of losing candidates who would want to 
clerk for me. 
1999 Survey #67 Impression that many offers with short deadlines were being 
made. 
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Table A6:  Judges’ Reasons for Making Offers Before Completing 
Scheduled Interviews, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 (continued) 
Survey Judge’s reason for making offers before completing 
scheduled interviews 
1999 Survey #30 My staff consists of 4 clerks and 1 secretary. I had to recruit a 
whole staff ( including a new secretary) in early 1999. One of 
my most promising applicants notified me she had been hired by 
one of my colleagues in November or December 1998. Under 
these circumstances, I felt that I had to accelerate my 
recruitment as much as possible. 
1999 Survey #104 Otherwise they would be gone, based on prior years. 
1999 Survey #3d Outstanding applicants who would be taken by another judge if 
I did not act. 
1999 Survey #82 Perceived competition from other judges. 
1999 Survey #24 Pressured by a student to match an offer. 
1999 Survey #187 Satisfaction with candidate, desire not to lose candidate to 
another offer. 
1999 Survey #18c So as to be able to compete. 
1999 Survey #21 So other judges would not hire someone I really thought highly 
of. 
1999 Survey #53 The best candidates disappear fast. 
1999 Survey #97 To keep from losing a good clerk to some other judge. 
1999 Survey #99 To prevent that applicant from being hired by someone else 
before I completed interviews. 
2000 Survey #69 A bird in the hand . . . . 
2000 Survey #41 Afraid they would be hired by someone else. 
2000 Survey #75 Applicant already had an offer. 
2000 Survey #73 As I learned recruiting for a law firm, it is an effective and 
necessary procedure. 
2000 Survey #45 Because applicants had other offers already. 
2000 Survey #119 Because if I see a good applicant, I want to make an offer before 
the person has been hired. 
2000 Survey #46 Because the candidate was so good, I knew form experience that 
she would receive and probably accept another offer if I waited 
any longer. 
2000 Survey #33a Competition and pressure to finish. 
2000 Survey #28 Good candidate-would have accepted another offer. 
2000 Survey #80 I did this for the first time ever, because almost none of the 
interviewees wanted to take my 2-year position, and this 
excellent candidate did; plus the candidate said that the school 
had instructed the students that they "had" to take the first offer 
given, and the candidate was headed immediately for additional 
interviews. 
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Table A6:  Judges’ Reasons for Making Offers Before Completing 
Scheduled Interviews, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 (continued) 
Survey Judge’s reason for making offers before completing 
scheduled interviews 
2000 Survey #76 I started late (later than other judges) and good candidates were 
being hired by other judges. 
2000 Survey #37 If I think a candidate would be an excellent choice I like to wrap 
up my efforts and leave it to the candidate.  Also, the longer the 
process drags on, the more likely that someone else will make 
him/her an offer resulting in nothing to show for our efforts. 
2000 Survey #114 Obtain clerk who was offered another clerkship. 
2000 Survey #5 Outstanding applicant who would be hired by another judge if I 
did not act. 
2000 Survey #43 Rolling admission  to keep from losing clearly acceptable clerk 
applicant. 
2000 Survey #74a To avoid losing the really good applicants. 
2000 Survey #100 To hire a good candidate before someone else did. 
2000 Survey #18 To meet competition.  However, at all times I had at least two 
offers open. 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
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Table A7: Student Comments About the Decision Not to Apply-  
Concerns About the Nature of the Process and Early Hiring, 1999 
Survey Comment 
1999 Survey 
#199 
[The market] certainly seems like a hellish experience and that 
definitely contributed to my decision not to apply. 
1999 Survey 
#210 
[My decision not to apply] was at least in part because of disgust 
with the process. 
1999 Survey 
#202 
I think the current system is absurd and I have yet to hear a 
sufficient rationale for it. Frankly, I chose not to apply not because I 
am uninterested, but because of the process. 
1999 Survey 
#211 
The reason I chose not to [apply] was . . . I was exhausted from fall 
interviews and was not ready to begin the process again. [Also,] I 
had spoken with many people about it and their tremendous 
frustration with the process discouraged me. 
1999 Survey 
#196 
Terrible market. The reason I did not apply was [that] I was burnt 
out from 2L law firm interviewing and because it forced me to 
decide to[o] early where I wanted to be two years from now. And 
the process is a hodgepodge lottery. 
1999 Survey 
#16 
The biggest concern that I had was that I had to be getting my 
application packets together so that they could do out in Dec.-Jan. 
That meant that the more judges I would apply to, the less time I 
would have to study for finals etc. 
1999 Survey 
#201 
[The process] was especially not attractive so soon after the 2L 
summer job search. 
1999 Survey 
#14 
[The] scheduling [of the market] (time of year when students must 
apply) is tremendously inconvenient. [This is part of the reason 
that] I, while theoretically very interested, chose not to apply. I 
hope too many others weren’t similarly dissuaded. 
Source: 1999 Second-Year Student Survey. 
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Table A8: Timing of the Market by Circuit, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 
Number of judges 
from Circuit 
Number of judges as a 
percent of total 
responses from Circuit 
 
1998-1999 1999-2000 1998-1999 1999-2000 
Started interviewing 
and making offers by 
Jan. 31 
1st Circuit 
2ndCircuit 
3rd Circuit 
4th Circuit 
5th Circuit 
6th Circuit 
7th Circuit 
8th Circuit 
9th Circuit 
10th Circuit 
11th Circuit 
D.C. Circuit 
Federal Circuit 
Total 
 
Done with interviews 
and offers by Jan. 31 
1st Circuit 
2nd Circuit 
3rd Circuit 
4th Circuit 
5th Circuit 
6th Circuit 
7th Circuit 
8th Circuit 
9th Circuit 
10th Circuit 
11th Circuit 
D.C. Circuit 
Federal Circuit 
Total 
 
 
 
2 
4 
4 
3 
0 
6 
0 
3 
6 
2 
2 
2 
3 
37 
 
 
 
2 
2 
3 
1 
0 
5 
0 
3 
3 
0 
1 
0 
2 
22 
 
 
 
4 
7 
6 
2 
6 
6 
6 
10 
14 
7 
3 
6 
2 
79 
 
 
 
4 
7 
5 
2 
5 
5 
5 
9 
12 
7 
3 
6 
1 
71 
 
 
 
40% 
44% 
33% 
33% 
0% 
40% 
0% 
30% 
26% 
22% 
29% 
29% 
30% 
28% 
 
 
 
40% 
22% 
25% 
11% 
0% 
33% 
0% 
30% 
13% 
0% 
14% 
0% 
20% 
17% 
 
 
 
80% 
70% 
38% 
100% 
63% 
63% 
71% 
60% 
80% 
88% 
50% 
100% 
11% 
71% 
 
 
 
80% 
70% 
38% 
100% 
63% 
63% 
71% 
60% 
80% 
88% 
50% 
100% 
11% 
63% 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys. 
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Table A9-1: Student Perceptions Regarding the Timing of the 1999-2000 
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks—General Comments 
Survey Comment 
Survey #25 I ended up having to miss the entire last week of classes to fly out 
to five or six interviews on the west coast, arriving back the day 
before my first exam for which I was entirely unable to study. … 
Although I'm happy (and lucky) to have ended up with what looks 
like an exciting job opportunity, I'm sure I'd perform better at it had 
I been able to catch the Establishment clause in Con law. 
Survey #34 To have a shot at appellate court clerkships you have to apply in 
the middle of Harvard's interviewing season.  It's ridiculous that 
the process is so front-loaded with lots of clerkships awarded in 
October and November. 2Ls in the fall have little by the way of 
writing samples and only one year’s grades. 
Survey #165 Judges need to be sensitive to the fact that travelling in December 
imposes enormous costs.  My fall grades reflect the fact that I did 
not have adequate time to pull together the course material. 
Survey #263  [T]he timing meant that some of us were interviewing during 
finals . . . , obviously a particularly bad time to be travelling and 
preparing well for an interview. 
Survey #28 Trying to apply for clerkships, do call back interviews [with law 
firms], 2nd year Ames [moot court competition] and normal 
classwork was absolute hell.” 
Survey #32 I couldn’t postpone my interviews to study [for exams]. I believe 
that I experienced adverse effects on my performance as a result. 
Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey. 
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Table A9-2: Student Perceptions Regarding the Timing of the 1999- 
2000 Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks—Statements About 
Difficult Things in the Hiring Process 
Survey “One of the most difficult things in the [clerkship hiring] 
process was”… 
Survey #17 Trying to schedule all of my interviews right before finals.  
Survey #19 Having to deal with the cle rkship application process so soon after 
the fall summer job interviewing season.  
Survey #55 Scheduling during exam period. 
Survey #58 Sending out clerkship applications, deciding on summer work and 
studying for finals at the same time. 
Survey #60 Juggling clerkship applications, summer job interviews and finals.  
Survey #165 Scheduling and attending interviews during exam week.  
Survey #166 Scheduling interviews on week before finals.  
Survey #169 Trying to balance applications, interviews for summer 
associateships, . . . and studying.  
Survey #196 Dealing with clerkship and summer law firm process 
simultaneously.  
Survey #199  Ramping up . . . for application in the beginning of the 2nd year 
(while interviewing with firms).  
Survey #206 Having to interview during finals reading period.  
Source: 2000 Second-Year Student Survey. 
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Table A10: The Role of References from Classmates 
Survey Comment 
1999 Survey 
#154a 
In an e-mail headed ‘The Dish,’ one Washington, D.C. clerk leaked 
me the names of my classmates who had made the judge’s shortlist. 
In exchange for the gossip, he asked me to rank my peers. It didn’t 
matter that I hadn’t worked directly with them and knew nothing of 
their writing skills. It didn’t matter that after a year and a half of 
law school, I had limited experience to know what makes a good 
clerk. 
1999 Survey 
#119 
On the D.C. Circuit, peer references were being used to extend 
interviews and offers. I think [it’s] offensive that someone could get 
a desired clerkship because she had a good friend who made calls 
on her behalf. 
1999 Survey 
#164 
[A third-year student who would be clerking for a particular D.C. 
Circuit judge the following year] may have put the good word in. 
Judges called 3L’s in law review. 
1999 Survey 
#122  
Third year law students play an enormous role. The clerks sort 
through the resumes and then call their buddies in the class below 
and ask who to interview. This was especially important when no 
one had any grades in to speak of because the process began so 
soon. 
1999 Survey 
#43 
A 3L friend from undergrad. at Harvard who will be clerking for [a 
particular judge] . . . established contact with clerks in particular 
chambers. 
2000 Survey 
#3 
[A] 3L (future clerk) . . . recommended me to his future judge. 
Source: 1999 and 2000 Second-Year Student Surveys. 
a This response took the form of a newspaper editorial that the student had written 
about the market for federal judicial law clerks. 
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Table A11: The Importance of Recommendations from Familiar Professors 
to Judges’ Hiring Decisions  
Ranking of the importance of 
recommendation from a familiar professora 
Number of 
judges 
Cumulative 
percentage 
1 26 22 
2 23 42 
3 21 60 
4 10 69 
5 5 73 
6 4 77 
7 1 78 
8 or belowb 0 78 
a factor, but not ranked 11 87 
not a factor 15 100 
Total number of judges responding:  116 
Source: 2000 Judge Survey. 
a Ties in rankings were resolved by assuming that recommendations from a familiar 
professor received the higher ranking, so if anything the data reported here overstate 
the importance of such recommendations. 
b Some judges wrote in additional selection criteria, so it was possible for one of our 
eight listed criteria to receive a ranking below 8. 
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Table A12: The Role of Faculty Clerkship Brokers  
Survey Comment 
1999 Student 
Survey #134  
One of my professors gave me a glowing review when the judge 
called him, and 15 minutes later I got the offer. 
1999 Student 
Survey #116 
[Professor X] definitely got me several interviews by calling on 
my behalf.  [Professor Y] got me at least the [interview with a 
particular prominent Eastern seaboard judge] ([that judge] told 
me), and probably [another judge]. 
1999 Student 
Survey #1 
[Dean X] got me the . . . interview [with a prominent Ninth Circuit 
judge]. 
1999 Student 
Survey #119 
One professor basically got me an interview with [a prominent 
D.C. Circuit judge]. 
1999 Student 
Survey #9 
One recommender took a very active role in the process. I can tell 
because he clerked for a particular judge who offered an interview, 
lobbied the judge on my behalf, and served as a messenger to let 
me know where the judge's hiring was going. He also called to 
discuss how I felt about different judges/circuits. 
1999 Student 
Survey #114 
One of my professors really wanted me to clerk for a particular 
judge. But that judge never called me. When I accepted a state 
clerkship, this professor was upset and called the judge who she 
wanted me to clerk for, only to find that the reason this judge 
hadn’t called me was that she hadn’t started interviewing yet. . . . 
This judge now thinks that I will reapply next year, and my guess 
is that she will at least interview me. 
2000 Student 
Survey #37 
My recommender got me many interviews I wouldn’t have gotten 
on my own because he was friends with many judges. 
2000 Student 
Survey #167 
My professor nominated the judge I interviewed with. 
2000 Student 
Survey #235 
I told a professor whom I’m close to that I would very much like 
to interview with my 1st choice judge. At that point, the judge had 
not called me back after I told the chambers that I’d be in his city 
the following week. My professor made a call on my behalf. 
Immediately after the call, the judge called to tell me he’d be 
incredibly excited to see me. After the judge’s call, my professor 
called me to make sure the judge called. I received my offer at the 
interview. Months later, when my judge sent a letter to all his 
2001-2002 clerks describing the other clerks, he pretty much wrote 
in my description that he trusted “his friend” (my professor). 
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Table A12: The Role of Faculty Clerkship Brokers (continued) 
Survey Comment 
2000 Student 
Survey #266 
One of my professors called the judge I will be clerking for and 
played an integral role in my getting the interview and clerkship. 
2000 Student 
Survey #252 
[The] dean of [the student’s] law school, good friends with [a 
particular] judge, called him on my behalf. 
2000 Student 
Survey #209 
[V]arious [faculty from the student’s school] played enormous 
roles getting me interviews with the three judges I applied to. 
2000 Student 
Survey #165 
[O]ne of my recommenders carried considerable weight with 
several judges. I was told several times that her name and 
recommendation secured my interview. 
2000 Student 
Survey #8 
A professor called to get me an interview despite the fact that all 
interviews had been filled. 
1999 Judge 
Survey #52 
[I] delegate[] [hiring] to [the] Clerkship Committee at a Law 
School. 
1999 Judge 
Survey #61 
I always take (or almost always) one law clerk from Harvard, 
recommended by my classmate, [Professor Z]. 
1999 Judge 
Survey #52 
[I have] arrangement w[ith] [a] law school: I hire people we 
mutually agree on: The interview is a formality ([and] sometimes I 
hire w[ithout] interviews). 
2000 Judge 
Survey #70 
[A]t least one of my clerks is, in effect, picked by a certain law 
professor. 
Sources: 1999 and 2000 Second-Year Student Surveys; 1999 and 2000 Judge 
Surveys. 
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